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Long-term goals typically represent our deepest concerns and interests: they are 
our current life-size ambitions. Whereas instrumentalist theories of deliberation claim 
that the point of having them is achieving them, I argue that deliberation toward final 
ends operates primarily in the service of decision-making for present action. We use them 
to generate priorities in the here and now. Functioning in this capacity, having long-term 
goals is valuable regardless of whether we achieve or abandon them later. That’s a good 
thing, because while it is rarely acknowledged in philosophical work, we typically 
abandon the large majority of long-term goals that we pursue at different periods of life. 
Embracing the idea that abandoning goals is not a practical failure, my proposal calls for 
a reassessment of practical commitment. It makes sense to give ourselves some slack 
between what practical rationality demands of us now and what happens later. I conclude 
that a proper account of practical rationality will require coming to terms with a more 
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Keep Ithaka always in your mind. 
Arriving there is what you are destined for. 
But do not hurry the journey at all. 
Better if it lasts for years, 
so you are old by the time you reach the island, 
wealthy with all you have gained on the way, 
not expecting Ithaka to make you rich. 
 
Ithaka gave you the marvelous journey. 
Without her you would not have set out. 
She has nothing left to give you now. 
 
And if you find her poor, Ithaka won’t have fooled you. 
Wise as you will have become, so full of experience, 




Consider a child declaring that he is going to be a firemen when he grows up. On 
the received view of practical rationality, that is, the instrumental account of practical 
reasoning, the situation is one in which the child embraces the pursuit of that goal, and 
his work will be complete upon becoming a fireman. Practically, rational individuals take 
the means to their ends. That description, however, does not quite fit with the facts. We 
expect the boy to use his goal in figuring out what to do now, but it would be quite 
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surprising if he actually became a fireman in the long run. That’s because we expect his 
final ends to change. At the same time, we don’t tend to think it is a mistake or a waste 
for the boy to pursue the goal for a time. So in this case of pursuing a goal, we don’t 
expect the goal to be achieved, and we don’t think pursuing it is a waste.  
The scenario is not an anomaly. Children go through cycles like this all the time, 
and when we, as adults, look to what they’re doing, we see it as a good strategy; we think 
they are getting something right about deliberation and decision. The goal of becoming a 
fireman helps the boy decide what to do in the present, where that involves commitment 
and self-understanding. Using long-term goals for deciding what to do in the present is a 
way of asserting deliberative control over the direction our lives will take. In addition, the 
experiences themselves are valuable. Learning about becoming a fireman serves as a 
source of information about the world and as input to future deliberation about future 
goals and actions. Such considerations apply to adult decision-making as well. Adults 
also act in the service of long-term goals, we gain something from those experiences, and 
that brings about changes in what we care about going forward. Those changes include 
abandoning our goals for the sake of something new. 
The point to notice is that all of these considerations remain true about what the 
boy is doing regardless of whether he actually becomes a fireman when he grows up. 
Theorists tell us that we pursue goals for the sake of achieving them, but it’s clear that 
there are other benefits to organizing our action this way. What the example shows is that 
we need to acknowledge that the local value of a long-term goal is distinct from the 
distant value inherent in achieving it.  
Although these claims are compatible with taking instrumental reasoning to be the 
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foundation of practical reason, they work against the assumption that having and 
pursuing long-term goals is strictly in order to achieve them. We certainly do organize 
our lives around our deepest commitments and self-conception, but what those things are 
change over time: long-term, final ends are quite vulnerable to revision. Living a human 
life, or even pursuing a particular long-term goal, just isn’t like running one’s way 
through a previously determined race course. Desires and attitudes are capricious; they 
get in the way of treating plans like a predetermined path. We change our minds about 
what we want and which desires to satisfy all the time. We have to compromise and make 
sacrifices in the face of unpredictable circumstances. And it’s all perfectly natural 
because the stages of a human life themselves bring about very real changes in what 
matters to us.  
These observations suggest that we shouldn’t take means-end reasoning at face 
value. It isn’t any sort of “necessary truth” that the only reason to figure out how to attain 
our ends is in order to achieve them, even if the thought is initially persuasive. Thus, my 
project is to investigate what reasons there might be for planning and pursuing long-term 
goals even if we don’t achieve them later on. I want to consider what—if any—practical 
advantage we stand to gain from calculating the means to an end independently of 
whether we ultimately achieve the goal. If, as I suspect, there are such reasons for 
planning and pursuing goals, we will have an explanation for what is otherwise an 
unattractive philosophical consequence of the natural fact that what we care about 
changes as our lives proceed. We will have done so by illustrating how abandoning a 
long-term goal is an acceptable outcome of perfectly rational deliberation and decision. 
And instead of concluding that practical rationality demands something that agents like 
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us just cannot do, I’ll offer an account of practical rationality that accommodates what 
makes sense for us.  
The place to begin my discussion is with instrumentalist accounts of practical 
reasoning. Instrumentalism is the view that practical reasoning consists of means-end 
reasoning exclusively. Although philosophers have argued about the exclusivity clause, 
they have accepted the centrality of means-end reasoning with very little critical uptake. 
Having done so, we tend to operate on the assumption that achieving the goal is all that 
matters. This assumption explains why instrumental reasoning has always been so central 
in theories of practical rationality.
2
 Perhaps surprisingly, there has been very little in the 
way of opposition. I suspect that, as least with respect to recent philosophical history, this 
is a consequence of how debate about practical rationality has evolved over the latter half 
of the twentieth century. Theorists typically came to the issues of practical rationality in 
the light of their significance for ethics. One’s account of decision had to accommodate 
one’s views in ethics, as well as providing philosophical support for them. Since nobody 
thought immorality was a function of means-end reasoning, debate focused on the 
deliberation of ends. So the frame of the debate portrayed means-end reasoning as 
unproblematic, both in terms of its inferential structure and its function in deliberation: 
instrumental reasoning is a stepwise calculation from a given end to the means for 
achieving it. We do it in order to achieve the goal.  
This preliminary analysis set the terms in the field of practical rationality even as 
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 Producing new species of “instrumentalism” is a philosophical cottage industry in 
recent years, and so there is much debate about what the core commitments of the view 
actually are. I use the term to pick out the family of views in accordance with the spirit of 
the claim above, even if they do not fully embrace the exclusionary stance of the view. 
For an illuminating discussion of the varieties of instrumentalism, see Candace Vogler, 
Reasonably Vicious (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 10-22. 
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debate began to move toward distinguishing it from moral philosophy proper. Thus, in an 
early and influential article, Bernard Williams presented a model of practical psychology 
that embraced presuppositions about the role of instrumental reasoning. He held that, 
after picking which desires to satisfy, the objects of those desires become goals, and 
theoretical reasoning determines the means to achieving them. Turning to the deliberation 
of ends, Williams’ paper helped to separate the question of whether there are rational 
constraints on final ends from the ethical evaluation of ends. But his practical psychology 
presupposes that there is nothing to worry about when it comes to means-end reasoning, 
for it is an underlying commitment to the stepwise calculative structure as well as the 
point of using it that grounds the account.
3
 The assumption that means-end reasoning is 
the core of practical deliberation because achieving goals is our primary concern is not 
given a substantive defense.  
Seeing practical psychology in terms of this instrumental structure gives rise to a 
side debate about how we choose which desires to satisfy. We need a way of picking out 
which goals to pursue. The catch-all word for solutions to it is identification. The idea is 
that who you are—where that understanding has temporal structure, and so also a 
narrative structure—is the source for resolving the matter of what to pursue. We want the 
solution to be one that connects an individual’s goals to her understanding of who she is 
as a person. Identification, then, is the process by which an individual determines her 
goals and thereby takes responsibility for them. In this way, debate about identification 
linked practical rationality to concerns about freedom of the will, and it altered the 
philosophical ties between moral and practical philosophy. Since moral criticism of an 
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 “Internal and External Reasons,” in Varieties of Practical Reasoning, ed. Elijah 
Millgram (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), 78-97. 
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individual for either her ends or her actions is appropriate only to the extent that she 
possess them, one’s account of identification becomes the bridge between rational and 
moral evaluation.  
Nobody seems to have questioned the idea that identification begins with a 
thorough-going commitment to achieving one’s end. Theorists have simply assumed the 
commitment is there, and that it just is full-blooded. Debate has been about what, if 
anything, is required above and beyond that commitment.
4
 But if I’m right, that’s not the 
proper way to think about practical commitment. Commitment is transient, and that 
means something has gone wrong in our attempts to provide an account of identification.  
Remember that the problem with taking instrumental structure as fundamental is 
that we are left to figure out what to pursue now. Theorists assumed that this is a problem 
precisely and only because the point of performing an action is getting the goal. From 
that perspective, asking the question of what to do now looks to be the same as asking 
what goal you want to get most. But if merely having long-term goals doesn’t require a 
full blooded commitment to achieving them later on, then figuring out what to do now 
                                                     
4
 There is a large amount of literature on this topic. See Williams, “Internal and External 
Reasons,” 80; Harry Frankfurt, “Identification and Wholeheartedness,” in The 
Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 
167-172; Michael Bratman, “Identification, Decision, and Treating as a Reason,” in 
Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), 185-206; Christine Korsgaard, Self-Constitution: Agency, 
Identity, and Integrity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 25; Martha Nussbaum, 
“Narrative Emotions: Beckett’s Genealogy of Love,” in Love’s Knowledge: Essays on 
Philosophy and Literature (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 294-5; Charles 
Taylor, “Leading a Life,” in Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason, 
ed. Ruth Chang (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 179-80; David 
Velleman, “The Story of Rational Action,” in The Possibility of Practical Reason 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), 158-68; Elijah Millgram, Practical Induction 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 50-56.While each of these 
philosophers see identification as a basic consideration in an account of deliberation, their 
substantive accounts diverge significantly. 
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isn’t the same thing as figuring out what you want most. These questions come apart, and 
so we shouldn’t assume that answering one amounts to answering the other. Moreover, 
we should provide an account of deliberation that doesn’t depend on a commitment that 
isn’t there. 
Because theorists operated on the assumption that instrumental structure is 
unproblematically fundamental, they conceived of identification as secondary to figuring 
out what you want and how to get it. But that isn’t the correct way to think about it. 
Being able to figure out what to do is of primary importance because it is a necessary 
condition for achieving any goals at all. What’s more, agents with a multitude of long-
term goals must have stable priorities in order to achieve their ends. If we couldn’t 
resolve these issues, planning would be pointless. If we can’t follow through on our 
plans, instrumental reasoning about the future doesn’t get off the ground as a form of 
practical reasoning at all. So it’s misguided to conceive of ourselves as agents who reason 
instrumentally about the future, and only after that’s done encounter the problem of 
picking out what to pursue now. Insofar as we are instrumentally reasoning agents, 
having a strategy for figuring out what to do must be a part of the deliberative package. 
Rather than thinking about it in terms of identification, I prefer to construe the strategy as 
one of setting priorities. 
I’ll offer an alternative solution to this problem that doesn’t hang on these 
presuppositions about instrumental reasoning. My claim is that we can use long-term 
plans and goals for figuring out what to do. So I’ll be arguing that long-term goals serve a 
function in deliberation above and beyond that posited by instrumentalism. The proposal 
is constructed around the need to manage the problem with limited resources and time. 
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Thus, we exploit the calculative structure in the plans and goals we already have in view. 
To see how it works, we must differentiate instrumental reasoning, i.e., adopting 
intentions to perform the means to an end, from the calculative structure of a plan, i.e., 
the agent’s representational outcome of deliberation. We use these long-term calculative 
structures as criteria for excluding present options. Simply having long-term plans and 
goals are tools for resolving the question of what to do. This creates a reason to have 
long-term goals in spite of how often we abandon them; for while particular goals will 
come and go, we are authentically invested in our present goals. Thus, it makes sense to 
decide in accordance with those goals. And as I pointed out earlier, there are benefits 
available to us for doing so.  
Let’s look at an example. Many couples who decide in favor of having children 
try to plan for it, figuring out when the time is right. Instrumentalists have it that means-
end deliberation will yield a concrete result, and perhaps it would, eventually. If that’s the 
strategy for making the decision, however, it might take a while to determine what it’s 
going to be. Life partners have many shared and individual goals. Ranking all of them 
together is itself something of a negotiation. Integrating the plans associated with each of 
the goals included in the set is a massive calculative task, especially given the fact that 
extended plans are generally not completely filled out, and they must be flexible. It’s 
certainly possible that the process will produce a single instrumentally-endorsed 
recommendation. It’s also possible that it won’t. It’s likely that trying to make a good 
decision in the face of this immensely complicated deliberative process leads to 
exasperation rather than a confident decision.  
The alternative I recommend exploits long-term goals and plans, but it abandons 
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the stepwise procedure of instrumental reasoning and plan integration. Long-term 
financial goals and plans are clearly relevant to decisions about having children, and 
couples can usually agree on a certain level of financial security as a subgoal. That 
subgoal can work to exclude options about when to have a child. Making a prediction 
about when they expect to achieve that security, they can simply remove any point in 
time prior to that from the set of options. Another major concern about becoming a parent 
is the potential for conflict with professional goals. People usually want to achieve a 
certain amount of professional advancement before trying to balance a career and  
parenthood. There are typically stages to developing a career, and these function as 
subgoals. Deciding not to have a baby until having reached one of those stages can also 
remove options from consideration. And so the procedure goes forward until the decision 
gets made. 
Instead of ranking final ends and integrating one’s life plans, deliberation appeals 
to a goal that is clearly relevant and important enough to use in reducing the set of 
options under consideration. We don’t need or want to integrate all of our life plans at 
once. We coordinate plans when we can see that our proposed courses of action are going 
to converge. That’s a matter of what the plan is for, and the particular details of timing 
and circumstance. But it’s a waste of resources to coordinate plans too far in advance 
since we can’t rely on assumptions about what the situation will be. The couple’s long-
term goals are there to provide constraints for a choice they are about to make, and it 
doesn’t matter whether the achieve them later. “Goals” such as these—I’m going to call 
them aspirations—are there to guide. When the couple drops them, they are not giving up 
or failing: the aspirations served their purpose in leading to a decision. Deliberation isn’t 
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a matter of integrating financial, professional, and family goals from the distant future all 
the way down to the present; the couple isn’t integrating their goals at all. It doesn’t 
matter how they relate to one another.  
This strategy is not means-end reasoning, but it is a kind of practical calculation. 
Instead of moving stepwise from end to means all the way down, it allows one to traverse 
the structure with a view to setting priorities, which is distinct from simply determining 
what course of action will lead to the end. The motivational backing for decision is the 
same as it is for pure instrumental reasoning: the background desire to pursue an end, or 
set of ends.  
The strategy has noticeable payoffs. Operating within the calculative structure 
laid out by available goals and plans, the decision removes difficult questions about 
value, and we evade the problem of ruminating about what we “really” want. Moreover, 
using preestablished goals and plans as deliberative constraints guarantees broad means-
end coherence, since the choice fits within one’s broader life plans. The strategy also 
loads motivation associated with discrete long-term goals onto the selection made 
because it aligns local actions with one’s long-term goals.  
Whereas instrumentalism construes goals as the inert stopping point for 
deliberation, my proposal ascribes an active deliberative role to them, namely, solving the 
primary problem for instrumentally reasoning agents: figuring out what to do now. The 
account, therefore, turns the instrumentalist assumptions I have been discussing on their 
heads. Instrumentalism takes thought about the present as doing work in the service of 
the future, but on my account we have to acknowledge that the converse is also true: 
thought about the future works in the service of present decision, and it is matters of this 
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kind that must be our deliberative priority. These claims stand in opposition to a great 
deal of philosophical dogma regarding practical rationality, so the next chapter is devoted 
to clearing the ground needed so as to find a place for the account.  
I have been trying to signal that underlying investigation of the instrumental 
assumptions about achieving our goals is an inquiry about the nature of practical 
commitment. I have been arguing that it makes sense to use long-term goals for 
deliberation in the present because of our present commitment to them, while at the same 
time, abandoning them is an acceptable consequence of a rational deliberative strategy. 
The issue with which we must come to terms is the transience of our commitments. An 
account of practical commitment must have something to say about how we negotiate 
these changes, rather than sweeping them under the rug. After presenting the arguments 
for my position in the next chapter, later chapters will look at two prominent accounts of 
practical rationality to see how instrumental presumptions about goals and practical 
commitments ultimately undermine the views.  
The first type of position I will examine is that of the New Kantians.
5
 The primary 
innovation of this group in moral philosophy is the appeal to practical rather than 
theoretical rationality in understanding and applying the Kantian Categorical Imperative. 
As individual theorists, they present diverse views, but with respect to interpreting the 
Hypothetical Imperative—and so with respect to the heart of practical reasoning—they 
embrace the standard view. So they are an example of noninstrumentalist theorists who 
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 See Onora O’Neil, Acting on Principle (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 
1975 (published under the name Onora Nell); Christine Korsgaard, The Standpoint of 
Practical Reason (New York, NY: Garland Press, 1990), and Self-Constitution: Agency, 
Identity, and Integrity (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2009); Barbara Herman, 
“Moral Deliberation and the Derivation of Duties,” in The Practice of Moral Judgment 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 132-158. 
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make the assumption that I’m contesting about the function of instrumental rationality. 
Since I’m arguing that the assumption is false, the New Kantian position is as well. My 
purpose is twofold: I want to illustrate that the point I am making has consequences for 
straight moral theory, and it’s also a preparation for rethinking the varieties of practical 
commitment at work in our lives.  
Finally, I will address the work of Michael Thompson, a representative of the 
Anscombian approach to practical reasoning.
6
 Here again, uncovering false assumptions 
about instrumental rationality works to refute his view. This will show that even the 
recent turn to action theory is vulnerable to the claims that I’m making. So concerns 
about the transience of practical commitment have significant consequences for broader 
debate in practical rationality.  
Taken as two extremes, my discussion of these views should be understood as an 
appeal to search for a middle path. Practical commitment is neither wholly attitudinal nor 
entirely intellectual. In the next chapter, I’ll suggest that we can make progress on the 
issues surrounding commitment by thinking about a certain kind of practical self-
conception; for we can make a deep commitment to a conception of ourselves as agents 
in the business of advancing our interests, while at the same time acknowledging and 
managing the fact that those interests will change. Long-term goals give shape to the 
conception, thereby affording a broad temporal reach. The plans we have in view provide 
the structure. It is our commitment to the significance of this kind of conception that 
grounds our pursuits, and it is the internal calculative structure of the concept that we 
exploit in figuring out what to do now. 
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 Michael Thompson, Life and Action: Elementary Structures of Practice and Practical 
Thought (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008). 
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Before starting in on the arguments, there are a couple of general comments I 
want to make. First, there is a body of literature that I will not be addressing, namely, that 
which falls under the rubric of decision theory. The reason is that mainstream economists 
treat choice as “a behavioral pattern… influenced, through any kind of channel, by 
incentives.”7 That represents a significant difference between economic and philosophical 
accounts of decision. Providing an analysis and finding common ground is just too large 
a task to take up in this context. Secondly, I hope to avoid any and all issues concerning 
the nature of value. The position I am putting forward does not require taking a stand on 
these matters, and I suspect that doing so would only muddy the waters. One’s 
conception of value tends to be closely linked to one’s conception of practical rationality, 
and so if my arguments succeed, my results will contribute to that debate. 
While the instrumentalist account of practical rationality is a target for me, I want 
to hold onto the idea that the calculative structure of our practical thinking is profoundly 
important. My aim is to dislodge some of the preconceptions about why it’s so 
significant, thereby updating and increasing our understanding of it. By no longer taking 
the function of long-term goals or means-end reasoning for granted, my conclusions 
serve to distance us from the previous generation’s debate about instrumentalism and 
liberate us from the problem of preference ranking. My view of practical reasoning 
embraces—rather than avoids—the empirical facts about abandoning goals, and in so 
doing, presents an opportunity to locate the focus of our deliberation, agency, and action 
in the present rather than the future. 
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THE PRIORITIZATION PROBLEM 
 
A story: Jeremy settles down at his desk one evening to study for 
an examination. Finding himself a little too restless to concentrate, 
he decides to take a walk in the fresh air. His walk takes him past a 
nearby bookstore, where the sight of an enticing title draws him in 
to look at a book. Before he finds it, however, he meets his friend 
Neil, who invites him to join some of the other kids at the bar next 
door for a beer. Jeremy decides he can afford to have just one, and 
goes with Neil to the bar. When he arrives there, however, he finds 
that the noise gives him a headache, and he decides to return home 
without having a beer. He is now, however, in too much pain to 
study. So Jeremy doesn’t study for his examination, hardly gets a 
walk, doesn’t buy a book, and doesn’t drink a beer.8 
 
Prioritization is the essential skill you need to make the very best 
use of your own efforts and those of your team. It's also a skill that 
you need to create calmness and space in your life so that you can 




The guiding concern in developing the argument in this chapter is that there is a 
deep tension between the thought that practical reasoning is—first and foremost—a tool 
for achieving our goals and the observation that we abandon long-term goals frequently. 
The question to answer is why we have long-term goals, pursue them, and then abandon 
them. I’ve provided a preview of my answer to that question in the Introduction: we have 
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 Korsgaard, “Normativity of Instrumental Reason,” 247 (footnote). 
 
9
 Mindtools.com, “Prioritization: Making Best Use of Your Time and Resources,” 
accessed May 21, 2012, http://www.mindtools.com/pages/article/newHTE_92.htm. 
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long-term goals for the sake of figuring out what to do now. Long-term goals help us to 
set priorities. If that explanation is going to stand, however, I need to show that the other 
deliberative devices available to us cannot do the job. Making the case for this last claim 
is the work of this chapter. With those arguments in place, there will be grounds for 
considering my alternative.  
We need to provide an account of identification, that is, an explanation for how 
agents pick out which goal to pursue or which available course of action to carry out in 
the present. I have suggested that, under the influence of instrumental assumptions, 
philosophers of practical rationality have a misguided approach to the problem, so I’ll 
start with a critique of the standard approaches, focusing on those that hew closely to 
traditional instrumentalism. I will then present my account of how we make choices 
about what to do in the present, that is, how we prioritize, arguing that, contrary to the 
received view, much of the deliberation associated with final ends serves us primarily in 
setting priorities. This is a surprising thesis, so I’ll conclude with an additional argument 
to illustrate how, when you look closely, purported instrumentalist solutions end up 
presupposing that the problem has been solved already.  
Dyed-in-the-wool instrumentalists may not be convinced, but I hope my 
arguments will persuade them that, even if an instrumentalist strategy for setting 
priorities can work, it’s not always the most effective or efficient way to do it. That’s 
reason enough for giving my alternative a fair hearing. Taking the framework of bounded 
rationality as a starting point, we should expect boundedly rational agents to develop a 
variety of strategies for setting priorities. The position I’ll be defending suggests that our 
thought about the future is a tool for being successful now, and so my proposal is an 
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attempt to think about how goals might do more for us than function as the endpoint of 
deliberation merely. If abandoning goals is an acceptable consequence of reasonable 
deliberative practices, my proposal is a more realistic model of our deliberative practices, 
and it contributes to debate over identification as well.  
 
The Problems with Ranking Preferences 
I will begin by assuming, throughout most of this chapter, that practical rationality 
consists in means-end reasoning, and nothing further. This conception encompasses the 
ability to plan, restricting the notion of planning to constructing extended courses of 
action in the pursuit of less immediate goals. That is to say, planning does not have any 
built-in deliberative strategy for managing the problem of prioritization.
10
 This starting 
point provides a clear and concise view of practical deliberation: there is one deliberative 
strategy and a determinate set of inputs upon which it works. The strategy is means-end 
reasoning, and the inputs on which it operates are one’s goals and the associated beliefs 
about how to go about achieving those goals.  
As has long been acknowledged, prioritization requires some further skill above 
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 I am using the notion of planning to refer to sophisticated instrumental deliberation 
merely. This is distinct from Michael Bratman’s more elaborate treatment of plans and 
planning. Bratman uses our capacity to plan in illuminating the question of what it is for 
us to have an intention, and he characterizes our agency as planning agency. In arguing 
for these claims, having a plan commits an agent to more than having a complicated 
means-end strategy for achieving a medium- or long-term goal. In particular, Bratman’s 
agents use plans to constrain further deliberation about action, and thus, plans function in 
managing problems of prioritization. In introducing this more primitive idea of planning, 
I am circumscribing the deliberative strategy more tightly and thus, distinguishing it from 
Bratman’s. See Michael Bratman, “Introduction: Planning Agents in a Social World,” in 
Faces of Intention (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999), 1-12.  
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and beyond instrumental reasoning.
11
 Over the long haul, just randomly picking among 
options will not do. Arbitrarily made choices produce disorganization, wasted resources, 
and lost opportunities. The general of an invading army who just randomly picks from 
among his strategic options will undoubtedly lose the war. The same is true for individual 
agents. An early and apparently persuasive suggestion was that we figure out what to do 
by ranking our preferences. The idea was that individuals observe the strengths of their 
desires and rank them. The resulting list becomes the game plan for action.  
 In broad strokes, resistance to this type of approach has centered on the claim that 
desires can’t generate that kind of list. Determining preference by the strengths of one’s 
desires requires that the desires possess strength intrinsically. Some theorists have argued 
that there is no such feature to be found in the actual mixed bag of conative mental states 
that enter into practical deliberation.
12
 Others have argued that the strength of desire is 
not a phenomenological feature of our desires.
13
 If either claim can be maintained, desires 
cannot do the work they are called upon to perform in ranking preferences.
14
 Another line 
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 Elijah Millgram gives a version of the argument in “Incommensurability and Practical 
Reasoning,” in Ethics Done Right: Practical Reasoning as a Foundation for Moral 
Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 274 ff.  
 
13
 See Mark Platts, Ways of Meaning (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1997), 256; 
John McDowell, “Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?” in Mind, Value, 
and Reality (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 77-94; and David 
Wiggins, “Truth, Invention, and the Meaning of Life” in Essays on Moral Realism, ed. G. 
Sayre-McCord (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), 127-65.  
 
14
 The concept “desire” invoked by contemporary instrumentalists is not best understood 
phenomenologically. Rather, it is a formal characterization of the relations between 
different aims and interests maintained by an individual. My purpose in revisiting the 
earlier debate is to sketch how discussion came to take its present form. For a 
18 
 
of attack suggests that, even if these problems can be put aside, closer examination of our 
desires (or goals) shows that they are “incommensurable.”15 The claim here is that there 
is no set of standards by which one can evaluate and order all of one’s desires (or goals) 
decisively. The upshot, once again, is that, if this is the case, there are no facts about 
desires  (or goals) that can determine preference.
16
 According to each of these arguments, 
desires cannot be used to set priorities. Without adjudicating the success of these 
arguments, I will introduce a fresh line of attack, for I believe there are even more basic 
problems with the approach, and getting clear about those issues points the way to a more 
satisfying account of prioritizing. 
 
The Difficulties with Desires 
Instrumentalist accounts of practical reasoning assume that finding the means to a 
particular goal allows for motivational transfer from the goal to the associated means. As 
goals and means proliferate, so too the individual’s motivation spreads out across a 
number of different options. It follows that individuals with a number of ends in view 
have instrumental reasons to carry out a number of actions leading toward any one of 
their goals. This explains the appeal to measuring the strengths of one’s desires. But the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
characterization of how a “sophisticated” instrumentalist construes the concept of desire, 
see Millgram, “Incommensurability,” 275 ff. 
 
15
 Commensurability can be construed as an issue about the nature of desire or the value 
inherent in our goals. Characterizing the kind of difficulty that incommensurability 
presents to the idea of a preference order, however, does not require taking a side. I refer 
to both desire and goals in the text above as a way of acknowledging that different 
theorists will choose to cast the arguments differently. 
 
16
 For a survey of this debate, see Chang, Incommensurability, Incomparability, and 
Practical Reason (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 1-34. 
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strengths of our desires—assuming they have strengths—are remarkably unstable. They 
can and do change quickly, at a moment’s notice. This happens for any number of 
reasons. Frustration, boredom, anxiety, and stress distract us from what we are doing and 
lead us to new pursuits. New goals diminish the appeal of our present aims. Changes in 
circumstances provide us with different opportunities, and our desires follow and track 
these changes. As a result, the relative strengths of our desires are in constant flux.
17
 If 
strength were the basis for prioritization, then, our priorities would be profoundly 
unstable. We have a real life example of this: adults with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 
Disorder (ADHD). Unable to control their impulses, persons with ADHD struggle to 
attain the stability needed to maintain long-term employment and to complete projects 
and ongoing tasks.
18
 But individuals with this disorder do not suffer from the inability to 
reason instrumentally. The problem is that means-end reasoning itself has no resources 
for keeping one on a straight track. Setting stable priorities requires diminishing the 
influence that desires have on deliberation.
19
 I will refer to this aspect of the prioritization 
problem as the staying problem.
20
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 The story of Jeremy with which I began this chapter is a well-known example of this.  
 
18
 Diagnostic and Statistical Manuel of Mental Disorders, “Symptoms of ADHD.”  
 
19
 The deeper worry underlying the staying problem concerns the satisfaction of basic 
needs, both physical and social. We cannot expect the strengths of our desires on these 
issues to be any more stable than the others. Agents using that metric for decision are at 
risk of being unable to manage the basic tasks for which we generally take rational choice 
to be the solution. Candace Vogler makes a similar point in Reasonably Vicious, 19-20. 
She suggests that, given the “wildness of human wanting,” it might have been better, 
evolutionarily speaking, if we weren’t able to transfer motivation quite as easily as we do. 
 
20
 I wrote earlier that some of the standard objections to preference ranking point out that 
strength is not an intrinsic feature of desire. My claim differs slightly: I concede (for the 
sake of argument) that desires have strengths intrinsically. My point is that they do not 
20 
 
We also encounter difficulties because of the number of both short- and long-term 
goals we have at a given time. The sheer number of options we typically have ends up 
overwhelming the decision-making process. There is the straightforward difficulty of 
tracking a large number of goals, but the trouble here is more than just a management 
problem. As options proliferate, determining an authentically felt preference is less likely, 
and the preference is more difficult to discern.
21
 So there is also a problem of noticing 
minute differences in strength. Moreover, priorities must be informed by the expected 
probability of success, which is a variable that changes with circumstances.
22
 Recent 
psychological data confirms that having too many choices available makes decision more 
difficult, leads individuals to resist making choices, or provokes them into making 
regrettable snap decisions.
23
 I will call this aspect of the prioritization problem the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
generate stable preferences over time, nor could they be the basis of counterfactually 
based ranking. For all we know, ideal desires are as transient as actual desires. But even 
if we suppose that ideal desires are stable, they would still fall prey to the standard 
objections, and here I think they clearly are decisive. We cannot measure the strengths of 
hypothetical ideal desires.  
 
21
 Harry Frankfurt makes a similar claim in “Rationality and the Unthinkable,” in The 
Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998), 177 
ff. He suggests that “If the restrictions upon the choices that a person can make are 
loosened too far, he may become disoriented and uncertain about what and how to 
choose. Extensive proliferation of his options may weaken his grasp of his own identity. 
When he confronts the task of evaluating and ranking a large number of additional 
alternatives, his previously established appreciation of what his interests and priorities are 
may well become less decisive.” 
 
22
 Decision often relies on expectations about how things will turn out, which are 
inherently unstable. This suggests that priorities should be conditional. The fact that 
evolving circumstances alter the predicted outcome means that individuals will want to 
change their bets over time. 
 
23






Given these problems, it doesn’t look like setting priorities can be achieved by 
evaluating the strengths of desires. That feature isn’t stable enough to do the work 
required.
25
 Thus, measuring strength just produces deliberative complications. As the 
swamping and staying problems show, generating priorities is about control. We need 
grounds for narrowing the set of motivationally live options under consideration. We also 
need  a way of bringing deliberation to a close, and so evading consideration of new 
                                                     
24
 There is an additional problem associated with prioritization that I won’t take up 
directly in the text. Individuals often need to adjust their goals to circumstances, 
especially complex social circumstances. Means-end reasoning can change one’s course 
of action, but it isn’t built to manage rapid and complex change. It works best when goals 
are stable. When decision situations don’t reflect that ideal, calculative reasoning takes up 
much needed cognitive resources. There may be ways to integrate the prospect of change 
into one’s plans, but this presupposes that the changes coming are foreseeable. Change 
isn’t always, or even usually, like that, and so there isn’t a good way to plan for it. I will 
call this the planning-for-change problem. While solving it isn’t strictly necessary for 
prioritizing, sophisticated deliberators will look for a solution to it. If one could integrate 
a solution to it into prioritization, it would be deliberatively valuable. 
 
25
 The appeal of this idea comes, I believe, from considering what having priorities looks 
like after deliberation and decision are done. Once an individual sets an agenda, top 
priorities are more important. They have greater force going forward in decision-making. 
It is this that tempts us into thinking of importance as strength. It’s equally plausible, 
however, to understand the importance of priorities as the result of deliberation, rather 
than a guiding consideration during deliberation. David Wiggins makes a similar 
observation in “Incommensurability: Four Proposals” in Incommensurability, 
Incomparability, and Practical Reason, ed. Ruth Chang (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1997), 53. He points out that “An overall ranking … need not represent 
a complete or exhaustive valuation of the alternatives A and B, or a valuation of 
everything that really matters about each of them…. it is the choice of A … that gives the 
ranking, not the ranking that gives the choice. The two-place predicate ‘X is more choice 
worthy than Y’ plays no deliberatively useful role. It sums up a deliberation effected by 
other means.” Millgram also makes a similar point in “Incommensurability,” 164. He 
suggests that “Over the course of one’s deliberations, one constructs a conception of what 
matters, and in doing so, one may come to an understanding of some things mattering 






Another proposal has it that prioritization comes about through an individual’s 
identification with certain goals or desires above and beyond others. Identification so 
construed comes about when an individual forms higher-order desires regarding his or 
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 In reference to the planning-for-change problem, I want to point out that just as 
instrumental reasoning is not a good strategy for reacting to change, measuring the 
strengths of desires isn’t either. One simply waits for the dust to settle and takes new 
measurements. If that were all we could do, then I suppose we would have to live with it. 
But we might hope for a better option, and it also might occur to some of us to look for 
one as well. 
 
27
 Prioritization is not achieved through forming intentions. Having an intention to X 
upgrades a mere desire to X to actionable status, but that does not make X-ing a priority. 
We intend to do a lot of things, and without priorities our intentions get mired in the 
staying and swamping problems. Michael Bratman’s characterization of having an 
intention as planning to X supposes otherwise. For him, the point of planning—and so the 
point of having an intention—is that it allows present deliberation to influence future 
action and to promote intra- and interpersonal coordination. This is because having a plan 
to X involves a level of commitment such that any course of action that is contradictory 
or inconsistent with the plan is, for that reason, put aside. “There are internal norms 
associated with the role of prior intentions in guiding further practical reasoning and 
planning. Central to these are the demands for means-end coherence and strong 
consistency, demands that are themselves rooted in a more fundamental concern with… 
desire-satisfaction. It is because of these demands that prior intentions… pose problems 
and constrain admissible options for such reasoning, thereby providing framework 
reasons: reasons whose role is to help determine the relevance and admissibility of 
options.” Michael Bratman, Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1987), 109. The idea is that we operate with a deliberative bias 
in favor of previously formed intentions and so resist reconsideration unless 
circumstances require it. “Intentions are, whereas ordinary desires are not, conduct-
controlling pro-attitudes.” Bratman, Intention , 16. Bratmanian intentions arise within a 
“web of regularities and norms”  that “are appropriate for agents for whom such planning 
plays a central role.” Bratman, Intention, 10. That is to say, Bratmanian agents push the 
problem of prioritization into the background psychology surrounding the formation of 
intention. Once you take something up as an intention, that signals that it has become a 
priority. Such an account of practical rationality does not tell us how we prioritize, it 
presupposes that we do. One way of coming to see this is to recognize that planning 
would not promote coordination or extend the influence of deliberation for agents that 
don’t have priorities already. Later work suggests that Bratman came to see that more 
needed to be said on this matter. It is one of the motivations for his later work’s emphasis 
on policy-based intentions, much of which appears in Structures of Agency (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007). 
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her first-order desires about what goals to pursue.
28
 As a further condition, the individual 
must be “satisfied” with the identification, where that signifies “an absence of 
restlessness or resistance” to the volitional state of affairs.29  
Construing identification in this way misunderstands the structure of the staying 
and swamping problems and so leads to the wrong idea of what a good solution to those 
problems will be. Moving the focus of prioritization up to some higher-order level of 
desire with which one is satisfied is not a substantive way of responding to any of these 
problems’ distinctive features. The desires underlying identification and satisfaction are 
still unstable, not only at the first order but also at higher orders as well. Thus, 
identificational accounts do not address the staying problem at all. With regard to the 
swamping problem, there might be fewer higher-order desires, so the problem might not 
be quite as overwhelming, but there is nothing to show that this is necessarily the case. So 
while directing attention to identification might diminish the swamping problem, it might 
not.  
More importantly, the notion of identification and the role that it is supposed to 
play in prioritization simply reintroduces the same strategy of measurement we saw fail 
earlier. Although the issue is not taken up in the literature, identifying with a desire is 
presumably a matter of degree. It follows that priorities will be set by ranking the 
strengths of identifications with first-order desires. This setup for a solution faces the 
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 See Harry Frankfurt, “Identification and Externality” in The Importance of What We 
Care About (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 58-68; Bratman, Structures 
of Agency; and J.D. Velleman, The Possibility of Practical Reason (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000). 
 
29
 See Harry Frankfurt, “The Faintest Passion” in Necessity, Volition, and Love 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 95-107. 
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same set of problems that preference ranking did. The move simply directs the measuring 
procedure at identification, rather than desire. But if it’s true that the psychology of desire 
is too complicated to measure along the dimension of strength, we should expect the 
psychology of identification to be the same. Identifying with a desire is itself an obscure 
notion; if we can’t clarify what it is exactly, measuring will be problematic. Moreover, 
we identify with different desires for different reasons, and I suspect, in different ways. 
Does it make sense to compare identifying with the desire to be loved with identifying 
with the desire to have a pleasant evening? If not, then issues of incommensurability will 
arise in the context of identification as well.
30
  
Adherents of this type of view will likely reject this analysis. But if it’s not 
strength that underwrites prioritizing through identification, it’s not clear what is doing 
the work. Harry Frankfurt appeals to “satisfaction,” as does Michael Bratman.31 By fiat 
on the part of both philosophers, satisfaction is an all-or-nothing sentiment, so it isn’t the 
concept with which the folk are familiar. But if that is how we ought to understand the 
concept, then satisfaction isn’t the right kind of consideration to employ in setting 
priorities. An absence of resistance or restlessness with respect to a desire or a policy 
does not single it out as a priority. For one can be and usually is satisfied with a number 
of second-order desires and policies. All of the first-order desires thereby endorsed, in the 
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 My argument rejects both identification-style accounts and strength-of-desire-style 
accounts without entering into the debate about whether or not desires, values, or goals 
are incommensurable. Incommensurability is surely a deep and interesting problem, but 
finding a solution to it is not the key to resolving the staying problem. The issues here are 
more basic than commensurability. Thus, we can put the debate about commensurability 
to one side. 
 
31
 See Frankfurt, “Faintest Passion,” 102-06; Michael Bratman, “Reflection, Planning, 
and Temporally Extended Agency,” in Structures of Agency: Essays (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 21-46. 
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case of Frankfurt, and all of the actions in accord with an agent’s policies, in the case of 
Bratman, have the same standing with respect to making a choice.
32
 The all-or-nothing 
structure of satisfaction means that tracking just that feature doesn’t yield clear priorities; 
it reveals a set of equally acceptable options regarding what to do. Agents deliberating in 
this way still have the work of prioritization left to do.  
David Velleman claims that there is an irrevocable inclination to be in conscious 
control of what you’re doing. Satisfying that desire grounds identification with a certain 
course of action. “Once you accept that you’re going to do something, … the inclination 
toward being in conscious control will reinforce your other motives for doing it.”33 This 
account simply ignores the problem. When an agent is deliberating about which course of 
action to choose, that just means she hasn’t settled on a particular course of action yet. 
Accepting an action as the one to do is the deliberative problem. So on this account, the 
question of prioritization is swept under the rug.
34
 As a further problem, he supposes that 
the extra motivation associated with the inclination to know what you’re doing will 
always decide the matter. There isn’t a clear reason to assume that’s true, and so the 
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 Bratman can and does appeal to the idea that prior policies constrain the adoption of 
new policies if they do not cohere or are not consistent with them. It’s not clear that this 
solves the problem of setting priorities, since it’s possible that one’s actual policies 
endorse a number of potential courses of action. But the move is subject to the same kind 
of objections I offered against his earlier account of how prior intentions constrain the 
adoption of new intentions. See footnote 20 of this chapter for the arguments. 
 
33
 David Velleman, “The Possibility of Practical Reason,” in The Possibility of Practical 
Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 196. 
 
34
 Velleman might try to respond by saying that weighing of different considerations 
happens before adding the extra inclination to know what you’re doing. But then it isn’t 
one’s acceptance of an act that is doing the decision-making; it is the strength or weight 
of one’s inclinations. This is not in the spirit of his account and would otherwise be 
susceptible to the objections to this style of account I presented earlier.  
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account leads us back to a measuring problem. 
These accounts depend on the thought that introducing these various structural 
features into the process of deliberation will reduce the number of possible actions 
enough to set priorities. It is not clear that they do, however, and the arguments are not 
there to clarify how they might. Indeed, these accounts seem to put the cart before the 
horse: they point us to a moment in deliberation when it is clear that an agent has 
priorities. Unfortunately, it is that very achievement that we are trying to understand.  
A real solution to the prioritization problem will place limits on deliberation as 
well as motivational transfer. This requires refereeing between competing motivations, 
actions, and goals. Given the instability of both desire and circumstance, this is not likely 
to come about by merely evaluating one’s motivational states. We need additional 
deliberative resources, and that suggests that we need a richer conceptual framework for 
thinking about deliberation. It also suggests that being able to prioritize involves 
engaging more fully with the content of deliberation. For placing a meaningful boundary 
around the set of options being considered will have to be sensitive to what those options 
actually are. Thus, adjudicating between different courses of action calls for relating 
one’s decision to broader concerns. Taking these observations into consideration, I now 
turn to presenting my own strategy for prioritization.  
 
Making Progress with Prioritization 
Plans are calculative structures generated by means-end reasoning. Since agents 
have a number of goals, means-end reasoning integrates distinct plans, putting in place a 
broader calculative framework. Temporally distant goals will mark the limits of that 
27 
 
framework. Plans are also gappy. Not every step of the way is filled in, especially at a 
distance. But agents tend to have a basic sense of how to achieve even long-term goals. 
Instrumental reasons for action track this partially integrated, gappy calculative structure. 
Acknowledging that we update our long-term goals and plans going forward, our general 
plans adapt to these changes.
35
  
This calculative structure is central to my recommendation for how to set 
priorities.
36
 The overall calculative framework of our general plans represents a practical 
ideal, anchored by one’s final ends. Final ends possess a deep significance; they are life-
size ambitions, and so we keep them in view as we make the smaller decisions of our life. 
As long-term goals undergo alteration, the details of one’s plans and aspects of one’s 
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 This signals an important contrast with Bratman’s theory of planning. For Bratman, 
plans permit present deliberation to influence the future, thereby promoting intra- and 
interpersonal coordination over time. But while acknowledging that plans are not 
irrevocable, he does not seem to see that that fact threatens the rationale for planning in 
the long-term. As plans get temporally distant, it is unlikely that they will remain intact, 
and so present plans will probably not influence future action. This is true even if we 
accept that having a plan amounts to having an intention. I have not identified the two in 
this chapter. My suggestion is that long-term plans serve present deliberation about what 
to do. Thus they influence present action more than the future. Using elements of one’s 
broader agenda in present-directed decision-making promotes agential unity in the 
context of local decision-making and action. Bratman seems to think that more local 
agential unity is just a step on the way to broader temporal consistency and coherence. 
I’m not denying this. I do, however, take local agential unity to be an independent 
concern, one which provides the grounds for temporal consistency and coherence; for 
that reason, it is a greater deliberative concern in our practical thinking. Thus, it is not the 
same concern that Bratman has in mind in discussing coordination. For his discussion, 
see Bratman, Intention, 2-13. 
 
36
 The first step in setting priorities is limiting options to those that are appropriate to the 
circumstances. Millgram argues that figuring out what matters is a function of 
experience, and so adjudicating deliberative dilemmas is a function of experience. By 
extension, learning to match goals with an environment also comes with experience. 
Thus, evaluating the fit between environments and goals will reflect how things worked 
in the past. For his general discussion, see Practical Induction. For his discussion of how 




practical ideal change with them. But we tend to abandon life-size ambitions piecemeal. 
It is rare (and risky) for a person to initiate and undergo a practical revolution. Thus, 
modifications at a distance typically leave broad features of the plans and the ideal intact; 
for that reason, the calculative structure of plans retains a certain stability despite 
progressive emendation. Furthermore, change at a distance tends to cause less 
deliberative upheaval. Just as movement at a distance looks smaller than it is, so it is with 
goals. Stars look as if they move at slow pace; the amount of distance covered in order to 
create the impression is vast. In the same way, deciding to retire at 70 rather than 65 




Individuals can use this calculative framework for prioritizing because of its 
stability. To see how, let’s revert back to my earlier discussion of the staying and 
swamping problems. Recall that both problems are the result of the inherent instabilities 
surrounding instrumental deliberation. The staying problem is a function of transient 
desires disrupting the decision-making process, and the swamping problem arises 
because of a high number of motivationally live options. Means-end reasoning cannot 
enforce a decisive path because, from that perspective, there are no rational grounds for 
doing so. Yet the broader calculative framework of our general plans possesses a greater 
stability. Focusing attention on that framework can serve to counteract the instability of 
more local concerns and interests.  
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 It’s worth pointing out that long-term plans resist analysis in terms of preference 
ranking. We don’t decide whether family life is more important than having a successful 
career unless circumstances force the issue. Moments of crisis in which important goals 
conflict are exactly that: moments. Until they arise, individuals put the question of which 
investment goes deeper to one side. This is true even in conjunction with the fact that 
most people have a core set of ends in which they make a heavier investment.  
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The process begins by directing attention to subgoals located in the medium-to-
long-term portions of one’s calculative framework. Given the circumstances, some will 
be pertinent to the present deliberative dilemma. These subgoals can function as 
principles of exclusion limiting the options presently under consideration. They exclude 
current options either because a course of action does not promote that subgoal or 
because temporal considerations recommend against the option. Let us look at an 
example. 
Arriving at work one morning, Anna is beset with a number of tasks. 
There are three or four projects coming due at her job, and the list of 
things to do is overwhelming. She is worried that she will not get 
everything done on time. It is not efficient to just start hacking away, since 
the tasks are associated with different projects. Thinking it will look more 
professional to have completed at least some of the work rather than 
having several incomplete tasks that are almost done, she prioritizes with a 
view to having something final to hand over to her boss. With that in 
mind, she excludes all tasks not associated with completing the shortest 
project. But there are still a number of tasks to consider. She is recovering 
from a cold, and so she will not have her best foot forward in reaching out 
to professional contacts and negotiating with coworkers. So her best bet is 
to have a quiet day at her desk doing research. There are a couple of topics 
in need of further elaboration, but given her anxiety about getting all of 
her work done, it is best to focus on an area of research that overlaps with 
another project. So she chooses to begin working on that task. 
Unfortunately, the company announces massive layoffs a few days later, 
and Anna is one of the unlucky employees. She leaves the job without 
ever completing any of the projects. She is not too unlucky, however. The 
expertise she has acquired in working on these projects makes her an asset 
to her previous employer’s biggest competitor. She is working away at her 
new job within a couple of weeks after being laid off.  
 
Notice that Anna’s set of decisions is not required by the goal of completing her 
projects. She could have chosen otherwise and achieved both the subgoals and the long-
term goal. She will probably face a similar dilemma in the future, and nothing about her 
circumstances will dictate making the same set of choices. She is also not ranking either 
her larger aspirations or her present options. She does not compare her goal of being 
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professional and her goal of networking successfully, and then decide that being 
professional is more important. Reflecting on subgoals relevant to the decision, she 
encounters considerations that will help her prioritize by enabling her to exclude options. 
She doesn’t integrate these considerations; they are one-off criteria for excluding options 
quickly and easily. But the appeal to these considerations is not ad hoc. They link the 
present decision up to larger and more important goals that guide Anna in this arena of 
her life. This is an important feature of the strategy, for just as utilizing a strategy of 
picking a random option when faced with a deliberative dilemma is counterproductive to 
achieving one’s goals, so too, just picking a random subgoal from one’s larger plans is 
not likely to produce priorities that make sense in a specific realm of decision-making.
38
 
Instead of integrating plans for all of the work she must complete, she looks to 
salient aspirations, namely professionalism, networking, and productivity. This doesn’t 
follow a stepwise procedure: it is not in virtue of any relation between these aspirations 
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 In Practical Induction, Millgram argues that individuals generate “somewhat general 
practical judgments” based on considerations “at hand” to limit their deliberative options 
and so solve the problem of prioritization. These judgments “connect” the deliberative 
options by introducing a further judgment that can allow a resolution to the dilemma. 
Thus, prioritization arises out of “ad hoc” practical induction. Practical Induction 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 60-61. The argument he offers is 
crucial for his broader defense of practical induction, since he claims that using 
judgments arising from any other source in making these decisions will undermine 
agential unity. Without agential unity, agents like us will be unable to carry out plans for 
the future. Practical induction, then, is the linchpin holding us together and allowing us to 
obtain future goals. This conclusion confers legitimacy on practical induction as a 
strategy of practical reasoning. Judgments based on self-directed prioritization initially 
appear to be a counter-example to that claim. To the extent that prioritization is grounded 
on the calculative framework of one’s general plans, it can solve deliberative dilemmas in 
a way that unifies the agent. This is because they are a function of an agent’s 
motivationally live aspirations, rather than induction over considerations that happen to 
be on hand at the time of decision. The arguments I offer in defense of self-directed 
prioritization thus seem to present a serious problem for Millgram’s view. See Practical 
Induction, 59-63, 67-86. 
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that she appeals to them in sequence or at all. The criteria she uses in coming to the 
decision could be replaced. And if other considerations within her calculative framework 
were to become salient in her decision-making, different options would have been 
excluded and she could have settled on a different course of action.  
These considerations make it clear that Anna’s strategy is not means-end 
reasoning. Appeal to her general plans does not proceed in a linear fashion from a given 
goal to a present course of action. The subgoals she appeals to are not tied together under 
a single, unifying end. Still, the option she chooses does emerge from within the 
calculative framework of Anna’s general plans, and when we look at what she does after 
the fact, it looks as if she is taking the means to her end. Of course, if prioritization is 
going well, it should look like that. After all, the initial set of options are all means-end 
coherent. The subgoals used to prioritize are elements in one’s larger plans, and what 
ends up happening displays calculative structure. None of this, however, looks to the 
form of thought that Anna carries out, and the story I told about her thinking is not 
strange or unfamiliar. Insisting that, because what happened looks calculative, she must 
be reasoning instrumentally is to maintain that the only kind of reasoning we can carry 
out with respect to the calculative structure of action is instrumental. However, the fact 
that actions are often—or even always—structured calculatively isn’t an adequate basis 
for thinking that our practical reasoning skills are so impoverished.  
Means-end reasoning generates the calculative framework, but that doesn’t imply 
that this is the only way to reason about it, or with it. Once it’s there, we can use the 
structure in a variety of ways. Since prioritizing differs from finding the means to an end 
as a deliberative problem, we should expect that how we go about solving it is 
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distinguishable from means-end reasoning. A similar point can be made about language: 
grammar has a definite structure, but we exploit it in a range of ways to serve our 
purposes. For instance, it’s an orthographical convention that we write English from left-
to-right, but grammar doesn’t require it. We could do it right-to-left. In fact, we flout that 
convention for semantic effect all the time. Think about advertising; flouting conventions 
works precisely because we still understand the message. Just as we can use alternative 
strategies for navigating grammatical structure, so too we can traverse the calculative 
structure of a prospective action in different ways. 
It will be useful to be clear about when long-term goals function instrumentally 
and when they are working to set priorities. So I will refer to them as aspirations when 
discussing their work in strategies of prioritization. Because Anna’s strategy for decision 
looks to the broader plans she has in view, I call the strategy self-directed prioritization.
39
  
The approach has noticeable payoffs. Operating within the calculative structure 
laid out by available aspirations and plans, the decision sidesteps difficult questions about 
value, and we evade the problem of ruminating about what we “really” want. 
Deliberative strategies that lead us in this direction are nonstarters: knowing what we 
really want is a sign that one isn’t dealing with a deliberative dilemma. Moreover, using 
preestablished aspirations and plans as deliberative constraints guarantees broad means-
end coherence, since the choice fits within one’s broader life plans. Finally, and as a way 
of counteracting the instability of the staying and swamping problems, the deliberative 
strategy loads motivation associated with discrete long-term goals onto the selection 
made. Thus, the chosen course of action is well situated to override the inclination of the 
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moment, and so agents deliberating in this way can overcome the staying problem. By the 
same token, self-directed prioritization is a solution to the swamping problem as well. 
With motivation weighted in favor of a particular course of action, the temptation to 
move between various instrumentally justified courses of action evaporates.
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It might be tempting to maintain that self-directed prioritization is just a form of 
instrumental plan integration. It certainly does have the effect of integrating plans, but it 
doesn’t accomplish that by way of means-end reasoning. Anna is not in a position to say 
how her present research will be a means to some future end. Self-direction indicates that 
her choice will fit within her later plans, and that’s enough of a reason to keep the option 
live in current deliberation. Instead of focusing on constructing a clear path to a goal or 
set of goals, we shave away options that we can predict should not be on that path. Self-
directed prioritization is a strategic shortcut we employ to evade the job of full-plan 
integration. It’s less expensive than constructing plans and integrating them, cognitively 
speaking. This is a welcome advantage because circumstances may well change, and self-
directed prioritization allows us to be more flexible.  
Once self-direction solves the deliberative problem of setting priorities, there is 
nothing to prohibit us from appropriating the language of preference. For having settled 
on a course of action that serves one’s aspirations and functions instrumentally, it is your 
preference for action. That a preference has emerged, however, is not itself evidence of 
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 Self-directed prioritization also solves the planning-for-change problem. Since the 
strategy imposes deliberative constraints progressively, deliberators can remove them 
piecemeal as well, thereby shifting deliberation in a way that is sensitive to the actual 
changes in circumstance encountered. Finding her mood to be improving, Anna can turn 
to negotiation with coworkers later in the day but continue working on the same project 
and the same research area. Not all previous deliberation is put aside. Rather, we attend to 
the dimension of the situation that has changed. 
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how it came to be. On my account, figuring out what to do through self-direction is how 
we arrive at our preferences. The practical ideal constructed by one’s long-term goals and 
plans is the source of one’s motivation. As I have pointed out, not even these 
commitments are irrevocable. The substance of our practical ideals evolve over time. 
What does remain stable, however, is having some practical ideal. Thus, the resources for 
self-directed prioritization are consistently available.  
 
Letting Go of Long-term Goals 
I have argued that we need a strategy of prioritization and have just presented an 
account of how that strategy might work. In doing so, I am claiming that long-term goals 
serve two deliberative functions. We are now in a position to ask which of these functions 
is more important from the standpoint of successful deliberation. Philosophers have 
traditionally assumed that the central and most important function of a goal is its 
instrumental one because, operating in this way, deliberation leads to attaining the goal in 
question. Reflection on the role that prioritization plays in effective decision and action 
should make us think twice about that.  
I have been emphasizing throughout this chapter that people abandon long-term 
goals more often than not. The default explanation for this behavior has always been that 
desire is arational, and so our intentions and goals are vulnerable. Given the source of the 
problem, philosophers presumed that nothing could be done to fix it. We are left with the 
conclusion that, when change arrives, we have to let it happen, leaving the effort and 
energy that went into bygone aims to be counted as a loss.  
But the explanation is not a satisfying one. For if it is true that we abandon the 
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large majority of long-term goals over our life spans, we need an explanation for why we 
invest energy and resources into pursuing them. If we’re going to abandon them, what’s 
the point? The question becomes even more puzzling when we consider that our long-
term goals are typically our most important goals. And acting in the pursuit of them is 
something we care a great deal about.  
Moreover, when we assume that achieving our goals is all that matters, we 
assume that the construction of plans for achieving them is the foundation of agential 
organization and unity over time; but if we take the fact that we abandon goals seriously, 
accounting for agential unity in this way doesn’t make sense. Knowing that attitudes and 
circumstances change, we shouldn’t be moved to pursue long-term goals, and we 
shouldn’t construct plans leading to them. Thus, the central source of our agential unity 
evaporates.   
Coming to see that long-term goals operate in present decision through 
deliberation about our current priorities resolves these difficulties. Self-directed 
prioritization highlights the role that long-term goals play in figuring out what to do now. 
We should not underestimate the significance of this. It is a consideration of primary 
importance. Figuring out what to do is the basis for making instrumental reasoning 
useful. If we can’t choose an action and proceed toward an end, reasoning instrumentally 
about action is a waste of time. More sophisticated plans don’t get off the ground at all, 
and very few goals will be achieved in the short, medium, or long term. From the 
standpoint of agential success, having priorities trumps getting the goal.  
Generating priorities is a reason to have long-term goals that does not involve 
achieving them, since their function as aspirations does not call for achieving them as 
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goals. Self-direction does not require it. Yet there is reason to articulate long-term goals 
so as to drive prioritization. My account, therefore, provides a way to acknowledge that 
we abandon long-term goals and embrace the need to have them anyway. Here’s an 
example: 
Arriving at the local library, I might wander aimlessly for a while, but 
eventually I direct myself toward the subjects that interest me. These 
things tend to line up with bigger and broader goals. Perhaps I’d like to 
read all of Dickens’ novels, so I pick a new one up. I would also like to 
learn how to repair my bicycle by myself, and then it occurs to me that I 
should balance things out with something “light.” This is how I figure out 
how to make my way through the collection.
41
 I bring the books home, 
and maybe I read them all the way through, and maybe I don’t. I now 
know that Dickens is too depressing sometimes, and I don’t have the 
patience to figure out bike mechanics. But detective novels are fun.  
 
However it turns out, the choices I made at the library still made sense. The fact that I 
won’t read all of Dickens’ novels doesn’t make reading this one a waste of time. 
Knowing that I’m less of a fan than I thought means that I’ll look to find new authors, 
and my satisfaction with the detective novel points me in a good direction. I certainly will 
never learn how to fix my bike, so now I have to decide: take it to the shop, or give up 
bicycling.  
The example shows that we resolve the tension between having goals and 
abandoning them by learning something from the pursuit of them. Knowing that my prior 
interest in Dickens and bikes has waned, I’ll look for different books next time. I’ll make 
those decisions by looking to other interests revealed by my—now altered—practical 
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read Dickens even more. I looked at all of these goals, and using the fact that the Dickens 




ideal. I haven’t lost a sense of agential unity because I’m not going to read Dickens 
anymore. I am unified on the basis of new interests going forward. What this shows is 
that the primary deliberative concern is the relation between present action and practical 
ideal, rather than means to an end.  
So practical reasoning—on my account—does not require committing to 
achieving long-term goals. We commit to long-term goals for now. Given the way our 
lives progress, however, it does not make sense to extend that commitment out to the 
distant future; and so that sort of commitment is not the source of our agential unity. 
Rather, it is bringing short- and long-term motivation into alignment with one another 
that creates agential unity. Calling upon one’s aspirations in the course of a current 
decision, one invokes real commitments, and the course of action chosen reflects that 
fact. Leaving the library, I am happy with my choices and pleased that I am working 
toward larger goals. Taking ourselves to be temporally extended agents and using that to 
manage our lives is what provides the unity. The point of doing so attaches first to local 
success and only incidentally to long-term commitment. Evolving practical ideals, 
flexible plans, and being able to set priorities for effective action give us all the unity that 
we need.  
 
Defending Prioritization Against Instrumentalist Dogma 
We have now seen how self-directed prioritization works. Self-directed agents 
make choices on the basis of the calculative framework of their practical ideal. Those 
choices are grounded on motivationally powerful considerations that emerge from the 
broadest and most stable aspects of their practical agenda. Recognizing that goals 
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function in this way helps to resolve tensions between the reality of abandoning long-
term goals and the picture of practical rationality endorsed by instrumentalism. An 
important upshot of that explanation is that achieving one’s long-term goals is not a 
requirement of practical rationality, and abandoning goals is not always a practical failure 
of some sort. It is now time to address what will likely be the most damaging response to 
my proposal: opponents will try to construe self-direction as an instrumental form of plan 
integration. My response to this objection comes in three stages. The core idea of the 
argument is that no plan of any temporal duration can be successful without prioritization 
skills in place. If you can carry out plans, you’re already prioritizing. 
My opponent will argue that self-direction is best understood as an instance of 
filling in the details of our plans, choosing actions that work toward as many goals as 
possible, and filtering out conflicts. When we encounter serious dilemmas about what to 
do, instrumentalists will claim that we look for a solution to the dilemma as a means to 
satisfying the goal of resolving the dilemma. Put another way, when determining a 
priority is a practical problem, coming up with one becomes a goal. Much like any other 
goal, we calculate the means to it.  
To see why this doesn’t work, recall that there are innumerable possible 
prioritization strategies. Some are strictly formal: choose the most accessible option, 
choose the least accessible option, choose the action that leads to the nearest goal, choose 
the option that leads to the most distant end, etc. There are also strategies that make 
recommendations on the basis of the particular goals: choose the action that your mother 
thinks best, choose the “coolest” action, choose the action allowing the greatest amount 
of socializing, etc. Many of these can probably be dismissed quickly (e.g., too arbitrary, 
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too whimsical, too impractical, etc.), but a great many strategies can and will present 
themselves for serious consideration. For instance, individuals can choose to prioritize 
goals in different areas of their lives. Financial, professional, intellectual, spiritual, 
physical, familial, and social goals can all make a reasonable claim for special attention.
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Since there is no strategy for prioritizing in place, the staying problem asserts itself. The 
inclination to focus on one set of priorities will come and go; the strategy used now cedes 
to another more appealing strategy, which in turn gives way to the next, and so on. As a 
result, the deliberator becomes swamped. New options also present themselves, and that 
produces an even greater organizational problem. Given the numerous options, it’s 
unlikely that an individual will have a decisive preference. Consider: it makes sense to 
say that I prefer reading philosophy to reading poetry. I like both, however, so I aim to 
have both on my reading list. It’s not quite as obvious that I have a preference between 
reading philosophy in the morning and poetry at night, switching between the two every 
day, or spending 2 hours on philosophy for every 1 hour spent reading poetry, or 
interspersing short poetry readings between longer philosophy chapters and/or articles, or 
spending the weekdays on philosophy and the weekends on poetry, or ……… The goal 
of prioritizing doesn’t produce priorities: it reproduces the problem. Thus, a 
straightforward instrumentalist approach to prioritization does not work. 
The reader will notice that my argument actually cedes more to my opponent than 
necessary. For assuming that there is no prioritization strategy in place, the goal of 
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prioritizing is not yet a priority, and the argument above tacitly allows that it could 
become one without a strategy already in place. This is actually false. Agents without a 
prioritization strategy will only work on the problem when inclination compels them to 
do so. Since it’s difficult, they will probably be inclined to walk away from the problem 
frequently.   
Taking a different tack, my opponent might concede that the calculative 
framework of general plans is a means to finding a priority. Coming to have one, then, 
will be a clear subgoal of prioritization. One could argue that we pursue that goal 
instrumentally, and having achieved it, we use it as the means to achieving the goal of 
prioritization (however that might go). While self-direction itself might not be an instance 
of calculative reasoning, self-directing for the sake of determining a priority is an 
instance of means-end reasoning. Thus, my opponent hopes to capture self-directed 
prioritization inside a calculative “net” by pointing out a “deeper sense” in which 
instrumental reasoning remains fundamental.
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The problem with this tack is much the same as the one we have just seen. 
Individuals without priorities will not be able to construct the calculative framework 
underlying general plans; for doing so is a challenging and time-consuming job. It 
involves, among other things, coming to recognize the enduring motivational reality of 
distinctive long-term goals, even in the midst of unstable preferences and inclinations. It 
requires the attention and cognitive ability to foster an understanding of the practical 
relations between goals and forming long-term plans. These plans must be stable enough 
to operate as components in the calculative framework as well.  
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Moreover, a practical ideal can generate priorities only if the aspirations from 
which it arises represent genuine practical interests at the time of decision. The 
constraints it provides must look to the individual like legitimate reasons to narrow one’s 
set of options. They cannot be goals set in place for the purpose of prioritizing merely. 
Having or choosing ends requires experience and personal insight, and these things take 
time. Thus, the work of constructing a practical ideal is vulnerable to the staying and 
swamping problems as well. For that reason, it cannot function as a subgoal in an 
instrumental pursuit of prioritization. 
My argument does not hang on the assumption that individuals without a 
prioritization strategy are unable to grasp the benefit of having one. They may see that the 
calculative structure of general plans would serve exactly that purpose. But without the 
tools for steadily pursuing that goal, they will wander away before completing the task or 
shift between courses of action that are intended to achieve the goal. Exactly the same 
thing is true for the long-term goals needed to generate aspirations. Individuals without 
priorities will not hold fast to goals that could become components of a broader 
calculative structure. Either way, achieving the purported goal is undermined. The 
problem is not whether or not an individual consciously takes up the goal of setting 
priorities. Rather, it is one of being unable to follow through on those aims with a steady, 
consistent course of action long enough to succeed. 
Both of these arguments have a single lesson. Pursuits that extend over time are 
pointless unless one has the ability to prioritize. I showed earlier that short-term 
instrumental success relied on having priorities, and it is now clear that this is true of 
long-term aims as well. The extent to which we accomplish goals at all, then, is a sign 
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that we do more than reason instrumentally. For agents like us, the success of means-end 
reasoning depends on deliberative skills involving prioritization. This is not a matter of 
what we deliberate about. Rather, it’s an observation about the natural limitations of 
calculative reasoning.  
Another instrumentalist response to self-direction would construe it as a special 
case of the “maieutic ends” put forward by David Schmidtz. Maieutic ends have as their 
object the directive to set other final ends. So for instance, the goal of choosing a career is 
a maieutic end in that it directs one to settle on a particular career, which is itself a final 
end. Prioritization, it might be suggested, is another instance of this structure; the 
maieutic end of having priorities justifies a given strategy of prioritization. However, the 
point I’m making is that, if you can’t maintain the goal of choosing a career as a priority, 
then you won’t end up choosing one. If you can maintain the goal as a priority, then you 
already have a solution to the prioritization problem.
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If the conclusion at which I just arrived withstands further scrutiny, it will be 
significant for current debate in practical rationality. For right now, I’m focused on 
distinguishing self-directed prioritization and plan integration. Plan integration is thought 
to be a matter of intrapersonal coordination. We modify our plans with a view to 
constructing a harmonious whole out of the many. We remove inconsistencies and 
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 See “Choosing Ends” in Varieties of Practical Reasoning, ed. Elijah Millgram 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), 237-257. Another similar response would be that the 
goal of having priorities could justify “just picking” a prioritization strategy. It’s not clear 
that it will make sense to manage the problem in this way. For instance, if the maieutic 
end is choosing a career, then the goal would justify deciding to be a circus clown or a 
doctor, but we typically want decisions to stand on firmer grounds than that. Self-
direction gives us exactly that, justifying the particular choice of the individual by 
reference to the individual’s practical ideal, e.g., I’m going to be a circus clown because I 
don’t want my life to be filled with serious responsibilities. 
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construct sequences of actions on the basis of all the plans we have in view. The 
assumption is often made that the guiding consideration of plan integration is efficiency. 
What that really means is that people assume that efficiency is a priority in our lives. As 
an absolute claim, that’s probably false. We certainly can prioritize other concerns.45 
What’s relevant here is that, even if plan integration is about “efficiency,” that imperative 
rings hollow when no set of priorities points to the consideration that ought to be 
maximized. Being “efficient” is about achieving the most important goals in the fastest 
possible way while making the least number of sacrifices. The reason that plan 
integration is not the same thing as self-directed prioritization is that the latter determines 
not only the important things but also the sacrifices. And so, again, prioritization 
precedes calculative processing. 
To claim that finding a preference cannot happen through evaluating the strengths 
of desires or one’s identification or satisfaction with a first order desire is controversial. 
Even more so is what follows: since instrumental reasoning can be effective only when a 
priority is in place, and such reasoning does not produce priorities, there must be some 
additional deliberative strategy which accounts for the obvious success of our practice of 
planning. I believe that the arguments I have put forward make a good case for accepting 
self-directed prioritization as strategy for doing so. I don’t expect that to be the 
predominant reaction to these proposals. For that reason, I am content to point out that, if 
means-end reasoning can prioritize, the process will be too slow to meet our deadlines for 
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purpose. See Christine M. Korsgaard, "The Normativity of Instrumental Reason." In 




decision, and it will be cognitively expensive. Having deliberative skills that minimize 
the cost would be valuable. Self-prioritization makes use of skills that we know we 
already have. It takes less time and less energy to produce a priority in this manner. It is, 
therefore, a legitimate competitor to the standard view of how we make decisions about 
what to do now. 
 
Conclusion 
The arguments in this chapter lay the groundwork for a new vision of our 
practical stance. My approach focuses deliberation, agency, and action on local rather 
than distant concerns, arguing that deliberation about the future serves primarily in local 
decision. The account of prioritization on offer also liberates us from the problem of 
preference ranking and Frankfurt-style accounts of identifying with a desire. This leads to 
a reassessment of the function of means-end reasoning and an expansion of the notion of 
a “goal.” With that accomplished, we finally have an account of practical reasoning that 
does not sweep the facts about abandoning goals aside, construing it as wastefulness.  
In addition, the position I have outlined suggests taking a very different approach 
to debate about instrumentalism. By introducing the construct of a practical ideal, it also 
promises to give insight into questions of self-knowledge and personal identity that 
emerge in relation to practical reasoning. My hope is that it can also be a vehicle for 
illuminating related notions about practical identity in the field.
46
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understanding of Christine Korsgaard’s “practical identity,” Martha Nussbaum’s 
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In upcoming chapters, I’ll take a look at how other accounts characterize the role 
of the calculative structure in practical reasoning. We’ll find that even philosophers who 
emphasize its centrality resist the otherwise appealing thought that agents like us can 
exploit it in more than one way. I’ll use these discussions as further grounds for 
recommending a revision of the core conceptual framework of practical rationality, but 
also as investigations into the ways in which thinking about prioritization can inform 
current debate. In the next chapter, I’ll take up contemporary Kantian moral philosophy. 
Although this is certainly not an instrumentalist position, it does adhere to the basic 
assumptions about means-end reasoning that I have been discussing. Critiquing the New 
Kantians’ work provides an opportunity to illustrate how confusions about practical 
commitment undermine their conception of intention. This creates a serious problem for 
their interpretation of Kant, and my conclusion will be that we must reject it. In the 
following chapter, I’ll address recent work being done in the philosophy of action. 
Looking at the work of Michael Thompson, I’ll argue that, while his focus on the basic 
structure of action yields valuable insights, it cannot provide an adequate account of 
reasoning about action. Taken together, these discussions amount to a larger argument for 
turning our attention to an investigation of practical commitment, and how it informs 
practical thinking in general.  
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CAN THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE TEST FINAL ENDS? 
 
Now that my account of prioritization is in place, I can begin the work of 
illustrating the consequences it has for discussion of practical rationality and normative 
moral theory. Looking to the work of the New Kantians allows me to do both. Grounded 
in the work of John Rawls, these philosophers—most notably Christine Korsgaard, Onora 
O’Neill, and Barbara Herman—base their account of Kantian moral philosophy on what 
they refer to as the “practical interpretation” of the Categorical Imperative.47 Recent 
publications by Korsgaard make her a prime target, but my arguments in this chapter 
focus on general features of the position. So my refutation of the view applies to all 
theorists endorsing those claims. Rather than working through the arguments to show that 
the account falls prey to the prioritization problem, the focus here will be on my claims 
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overlap on the core elements of this interpretation. My purpose is to focus on those 
commitments, so I will not be addressing the details of each position. See Onoral O’Neill, 
Acting on Principle (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1975), published under 
the name Onora Nell; Christine Korsgaard, The Standpoint of Practical Reason (New 
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problem for the position in her essay, “Moral Deliberation and the Derivation of Duties,” 
in The Practice of Moral Judgment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 
132-158. Still, she does not forego the philosophical commitments about intention that 
are my concern in this paper.  
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about practical commitment. As we know, commitment to our final ends does not tend to 
endure generally speaking, and this affects how we think about long-term intentions. 
Current theorists working in both normative ethics and practical reasoning will have to 
integrate these considerations into their understanding of deliberation, decision, and 
ethical judgment.  
In her recent book, Self-Constitution, Korsgaard tells us that moral philosophers 
see efficacy as the primary standard for the assessment of action.
48
 She takes issue with 
that criterion, and points toward “self-constitution” as the aim of action: “You constitute 
yourself as the author of your action in the very act of choosing it. I am proposing that 
this, not production as Mill thought, is what action is.”49 We might expect her to abandon 
efficacy altogether, but we quickly see that nothing so radical will be forthcoming. For 
Korsgaard, constituting oneself as the author of one’s action involves identifying with all 
elements of an action’s principle, including the end.50 Thus, attempting to achieve the end 
is a component of constituting ourselves as agents. Efficacy therefore remains a criterion 
of a successful self-constitutive action. 
My resistance to the conception of action as production is more thoroughgoing. 
As I have argued, with respect to actions directed at one’s long-term goals, achieving the 
end is not an essential component of successful action. The way in which we manage our 
long-term goals bears this out. Since this is a pattern in the way people manage long-term 
intentions, it does not make sense to construe those intentions as full-blooded 
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commitments to achieving the end. At the same time, I have emphasized that we use 
long-term plans and goals to solve the prioritization problem. They function as 
deliberative constraints on current decision-making, enabling us to resolve deliberative 
dilemmas, and so to determine a course of action. Because long-term goals can help us 
solve these problems, it makes sense for us to have them. Given the benefits of acting in 
accordance with long-term plans, pursuing them in present action is a rational solution to 
figuring out what to do now, regardless of whether you achieve the purported goal in the 
long run. Efficacy is, therefore, not an appropriate criterion for judging actions carried 
out for the sake of a long-term goal. Failing to acknowledge this constitutes a 
misunderstanding about the practical commitment we make to long-term goals.  
These considerations undermine the practical interpretation of the Categorical 
Imperative, typically referred to as the CI-procedure. Because the view does not take the 
temporality of commitment into account, it turns on a false picture of long-term 
intentions. If having an intention does not necessarily include a commitment to achieving 
the end, the prospect of failure does not have the kind of significance that the practical 
interpretation claims for it.  
 
Characterizing the CI-Procedure 
I’ll begin by presenting the details of the practical interpretation and proceed to 
my critique of the position afterwards. The New Kantians refer to the method that agents 
are to use in evaluating the moral and rational status of an action as the “CI-procedure.”51 
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 Discussion in this section draws heavily on O’Neil’s explication in O’Neill, Principle, 
59-83. Korsgaard outlines O’Neill’s work in Korsgaard, Standpoint. More recently, 
O’Neill revises her position regarding the true object of the CI-procedure, claiming that 
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Evaluation centers on one’s principle of action, or maxim, which guides one’s 
performance of it. Those not rejected by the CI-procedure are morally permissible. 
On the New Kantian account, it is an individual’s intention that underwrites the 
formation of a maxim. A proper intention—one that can be a candidate for evaluation by 
the CI-procedure—must meet the following requirements: (i) the agent must expect that a 
proposed course of action will achieve the given end, and (ii) she must see herself as 
being able to carry out the action. These conditions are combined with a traditional 
understanding of intention according to which (iii) having an intention implies a full 
commitment to achieving the end. In the preface to Self-Constitution, Korsgaard writes:  
A good action is one that constitutes its agent as the autonomous and 
efficacious cause of her own movements. … Conformity to the categorical 
imperative renders us autonomous, and conformity to the hypothetical 
imperative renders us efficacious. These imperatives are therefore constitutive 
principles of action, principles to which we necessarily are trying to conform 




Thus, for the New Kantians, an intention can be judged as rational just in case the agent 
expects and believes that carrying out the intention will be successful, and the agent is 
committed to realizing success. Taken together, these considerations have been referred 
                                                                                                                                                                           
one directs the CI-procedure at “those underlying principles or intentions by which we 
guide and control our more specific intentions.” O’Neill, Onora, “Consistency in 
Action,” in Varieties of Practical Reason, ed. Elijah Millgram (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press,  2001), 305. This has consequences for the resulting picture of Kantian ethics, but I 
will not address these issues, since the move does not undercut my concerns about 
intention. Whether we are assessing deep or surface intentions, the basic notion of an 
intention remains the same. 
 
52
 Korsgaard, Self-Constitution, xii, emphasis added. For a discussion of the traditional 
understanding of intention, see Harman, G., “Practical Reasoning,” Review of 
Metaphysics 29, no. 3 (March 1976): 432-63; H.P. Grice, “Intention and Uncertainty,” 
Proceedings of the British Academy 57 (1971) 263-279.  
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to as the “success condition.”53 
In evaluating one’s intention as a maxim, the CI-procedure requires that an 
intention have a certain form, providing both a description of the action and its purpose. 
Korsgaard characterizes it this way:  
Since the connection between means and end is a connection of sufficient cause to 
effect, one must include in the statement of the maxim all and only what is genuinely 
relevant to the production of the effect—the purpose—in the given circumstances. A 
maxim is a proposed justification of the action; and it is the connection between the 
action and the purpose that is supposed to justify the action. This connection is what 
Kant calls the “form” of the maxim.54 
 
Here’s an example: to fish upstream if you’re looking to catch trout in order to have it for 
dinner.
55
 With a proper maxim in hand, the CI-procedure requires determining whether 
one’s maxim can hold as a universal law without creating a contradiction.56 This requires 
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 Korsgaard, Standpoint, 143; emphasis added. Korsgaard’s characterization emphasizes 
the structural parallels between the form of a maxim and causal laws, thereby tying her 
account to the Categorical Imperative’s Formula of the Law of Nature: “Act only 
according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a 
universal law.” Kant, Grounding, 30; RPA 421. (For quotes from Kant, I will cite the 
Royal Prussian Academy page number immediately following the page number of the 
cited edition.) See also Christine M. Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends 
(Cambridge: University Press), 1996. Korsgaard also points her readers to O’Neill, 




 Regarding the issue of act-descriptions, there is, of course, more than one possible 
description of an act, and much ink has been spilled on whether this is a problem in the 
testing of an agent’s maxim. It might seem that the act description one invokes in the 
evaluation of an action is at least as crucial as the universality test itself. Again, this issue 
is not central to my concerns. One can find further discussion of the topic in Nell, 
Principle and Barbara Herman, “The Practice of Moral Judgment,” in The Practice of 
Moral Judgment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 73-93. 
 
56
 Generally speaking, the New Kantians tend to emphasize the Formula of Universal 
Law and the Formula of the Law of Nature of the Categorical Imperative. In broad terms, 
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translating the maxim into its universalized form. Using the example from above: 
everybody will fish upstream if they are looking to catch trout in order to have it for 
dinner.
57
   
Turning to evaluation, agents are to evaluate their maxim as a potential principle 
of action in a hypothetical world where the UC of that maxim holds as a universal law. If 
this state of affairs is conceptually and volitionally possible, then the action is in accord 
with duty.
58
 In this section, I’ll focus on the contradiction in conception test. Discussion 
                                                                                                                                                                           
the Critique of Practical Reason endorses this priority: “The rule of judgment under laws 
of pure practical reason is: ask yourself whether, if the action you propose should take 
place by a law of nature of which you yourself were a part, you could regard it as 
possible through your own will.” Kant , Critique of Practical Reason, trans. M. Gregor 
(Cambridge: University Press), 1788/1997, 60; RPA 5:69. One also finds Kant 
recommending this policy in the Grounding: “one does better if in moral judgment he 
follows the rigorous method and takes as his basis the universal formula of the 
categorical imperative: Act according to that maxim which can at the same time make 
itself a universal law.” Kant, Grounding, 42; RPA 437. Using these formulations as the 
guide in maxim construction serves two purposes for the practical interpretation. On the 
one hand, construing a maxim as a law of nature is a way of insisting on universalization. 
On the other, the move can forestall the following objection: if, in assessing a maxim, one 
could see that the result of following it universally created an unstable state of affairs, one 
in which following the maxim would become unsuccessful not quite immediately, that 
might not constitute a practical contradiction. Such an outcome “describes a situation that 
could not last rather than a situation that could not be.” The Law of Nature formulation of 
a maxim is supposed to undermine this worry because “the law of nature that could not 
last also could not be.” Korsgaard, Standpoint, 141-42.  
 
57
 Universalizing a maxim is not simply translating it into a universal claim. Universal 
statements do not have the form of a law, which is what the CI-procedure requires. 
Universal claims describe what in fact happens, albeit universally. A practical law, in 
contrast, would express a claim about what must happen universally. In Kantian 
terminology, universalization of the maxim follows the type of the moral law. Thus 
O’Neill refers to it as the Universalized Typified Counterpart (UC) of the maxim. For 
O’Neill’s appropriation of the term, see Principle. For the original Kantian terminology, 
see Kant, Practical Reason, 60, RPA, 5:69. 
 
58
 Categorizing the different kinds of duties is an exegetical controversy, and I will not 
take it up here. There is one broad distinction that will be of use in thinking about the 
significance of the two tests included in the CI-procedure. Some duties amount to the 
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of contradictions in the will follows in the next section.  
The New Kantians’ main idea is to see the contradictions that arise out of the CI-
procedure as practical ones. So the tests take intentions as their inputs. The contradiction 
in conception test (CC) evaluates whether it is possible for an agent to hold both her 
maxim and the associated UC at the same time. Contradictions arise just in case these 
intentions create a practical conflict wherein an agent could not embrace both intentions 
at the same time.
59
  
Since the interpretation rests on the ability to maintain both a particular and 
universalized intention at the same time, the New Kantians must provide a clear account 
of what it is to have an intention. O’Neill is the primary source on this issue.  
[The contradiction in conception test] asks whether we can simultaneously intend to 
do x (assuming that we must intend some set of conditions sufficient for the successful 
carrying out of our intentions and the normal and predictable results of successful 
execution) and intend everyone else to do x (assuming again that we must intend 
some conditions sufficient for the successful execution of their intentions and the 
normal and predictable results of such execution).…. There are….. good reasons for 
calling the contradictions which may be derived from applications of this test “inner 





                                                                                                                                                                           
performance of a particular action. These contrast with duties to have—or reject—certain 
ends. The former are typically construed as duties of justice, since one can force 
compliance in the performance (or nonperformance) of an action. The latter tend to be 
seen as duties of virtue. For while agents can be compelled to act in accordance with a 
given end, they cannot be forced to embrace the end as such. The contradiction in 
conception test is thought to delineate duties of justice, whereas the contradiction in the 
will test determines duties of virtue. 
 
59
 One can contrast this interpretation with the more traditional “logical interpretation,” 
according to which an agent’s maxim fails the contradiction in conception test because it 
cannot be conceived as a universal law without contradiction. See Herman, “Moral 
Deliberation;” Nell, Principle; Korsgaard, Standpoint, 42-50; and Korsgaard, “Kant’s 
Formula of Universal Law,” in Creating the Kingdom of Ends, 81-87. 
 
60
Nell, Principle, 73, emphasis added. 
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In having an intention, one presupposes the stability of basic empirical facts about the 
context of action. If I intend to go fishing, then at the very least, it must be a stable fact 
about the world that fish exist, that they are accessible to me, and that there is a 
reasonably efficient technology for catching them. Intentions also require that the world 
is familiar and predictable, since successful actions must fit the circumstances. In 
addition, the New Kantians demand that having an intention includes the expectation of 
“the normal and predictable result” of the proposed action. Their account of the CI-
procedure appeals directly to this expectation of success for both the personal and 
universalized version of the maxim. This addition is crucial for them, as it is this aspect 
of having intentions that generates practical contradictions.
61
  
There is also the matter of describing universalized intentions. Korsgaard suggests 
that we understand them as a “standard procedure” for achieving a given end.  
It is not just that others with purposes like yours may behave or find natural the 
option of behaving as you propose to behave. That would not capture the full force of 
“law of nature.” A standard procedure is the natural, obvious, automatic way of doing 
something. It is the method used by the culture or society, the one learned by 
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 In bringing both the background circumstances and the success conditions into 
consideration within the CI-procedure, there may be some concern that it invokes 
empirical considerations in generating a contradiction. Without placing some limits on 
how such information enters into the test, the practical interpretation simply could not get 
off the ground. O’Neill proposes two constraints. First, agents must presuppose the same 
background circumstances and success conditions in their analysis of the agent’s maxim 
as in the hypothetical world of the UC. So, for instance, if one takes staking the flag on 
the enemy’s territory as one’s end, then successfully performing that action is the 
standard for assessing the rationality of both the personal and universalized form of the 
maxim. Her second constraint is that agents must presuppose the basic features of the 
“system of nature” in which humans actually operate. This issue touches upon 
Korsgaard’s concern with the status of laws of nature that I pointed out in an earlier 
footnote. If it’s true that “the law of nature that could not last also could not be,” then this 
amounts to an additional condition on the hypothetical world of the UC: the UC must be 
an enduring law. The consequences of that fact will affect the prospects for an agent’s 
maxim. Korsgaard, Standpoint, 62. 
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O’Neill suggests that we construe universalized intentions as the intentions of a universal 
legislator whose dictates are followed out of necessity.
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Coming back to the CI-procedure, the contradiction in conception test directs an 
agent to ask whether both the personal and universalized maxims can be held as 
intentions at the same time. Contradictions arise when the agent’s proposed course of 
action (as an individual) is no longer a means to the given end in the UC-world. It’s a 
contradiction because a practically rational agent cannot be committed to achieving an 
end and performing a given action as the means, if it’s clear that the action will not meet 
with success. The situation amounts to a practical contradiction because such intentions 
violate the Hypothetical Imperative:
 “Whoever wills the end, wills (so far as reason has 
decisive influence on his actions) also the means that are indispensably necessary to his 
actions and that lie in his power.”64 If a maxim does not actually represent a means-end 
strategy for achieving the goal, reason requires that we replace it with one that does.  
If an action is untenable as a means to the end in the UC-world, the CC test 
construes it as irrational and immoral. The decisive feature of intention, the one driving 
the outcome of the test, is the expectation of success. Evaluating the rationality of an 
intention appeals to that consideration at two different moments in the overall procedure. 
First, we confirm that an action is a means to an end as a condition placed on a maxim’s 
form before applying the CC test. Second, the CC test requires confirming it again when 
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 Korsgaard, Standpoint, 93. 
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 See Nell, Principle, 70. 
 
64
 Kant, Grounding, 27; RPA 417. 
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placed in the context of the UC-world.
65
  
The New Kantians see maxims as articulating causal relations. Kant makes that 
point immediately after his famous characterization of the Hypothetical Imperative: “In 
willing an object as my effect there is already thought the causality of myself as an acting 
cause, i.e., the use of means.”66 This might make it seem that, when the New Kantians 
call for an evaluation of a maxim’s “expectation of success,” they are asking for a simple 
causal analysis and nothing further. All that would be required is determining whether 
performing an action would be capable of causing the end. If that’s what meeting the 
condition demands, then it doesn’t look as if the expectation of success amounts to a deep 
commitment to achieving it.  
Kantian scholars debate what Kant means by “an acting cause.” What matters for 
our purposes, however, is what the New Kantians commit themselves to in the practical 
interpretation; but they do take an expectation of success to be more than a mere causal 
analysis of a maxim. They take the success condition to include a commitment to 
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 The practical interpretation runs into trouble handling maxims of nonreciprocal action. 
For example, consider the maxim of always paying for a tank of gas but never filling the 
tank. On the practical interpretation, this maxim cannot be consistently universalized: if 
everyone embraced the maxim, tanks wouldn’t get filled, and cars wouldn’t function as 
modes of transportation. Presumably the point of paying for a tank of gas is to be able to 
use the car for transportation. O’Neil solves the problem by making use of the fact that 
the converse of the maxim is also not universalizable: an agent arrives at a similar 
contradiction in willing both that he always fill the tank and never pay for the gas and 
that everyone else do so as well. She proposes that the full CC test require that one 
submit both an agent’s maxim and the contrary of the agent’s maxim to the procedure. If 
the result is that both the maxim and the contrary are forbidden, then the proposed course 
of action is permissible. However successful this proposal may be, it is not directly 
pertinent to my concerns, and so I will leave it aside. The duty of reciprocity, if it is one, 
is a separate matter. If it is a duty, it will be a duty of virtue, which the contradiction in 
the will test handles.  
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 Looking to Korsgaard’s Self-Constitution, we find sufficient 
evidence of this. “Deciding is committing yourself to doing the thing. That is another way 
of saying acting is determining yourself to be a cause.”68 On her account, the 
Hypothetical Imperative is “a normative principle essential to, constitutive of, action 
itself. To act is essentially to take the means to your end … And to take the means to your 
end is … to determine yourself to cause the end—that is, to deploy the objects that will 
bring the end about.”69  Furthermore, her analysis of action is grounded on the notion of 
efficacy. “This much normativity—that the agent is guided by some norm of efficacy—is 
inherent in the very idea of action.”70 It is because we constitute ourselves as agents 
through our actions that they must be effective. If we aren’t effective, we aren’t agents at 
all. 
If your action is unsuccessful and you do not bring about the state of affairs that you 
intended, it is not (or not just) the action that is ineffective. It is not as if you were 
effective in producing the action, but then the action, once out there in the world, 
failed, like a defective machine you have invented and then let loose on the world. 
The action is not your product: it was you that failed. An unsuccessful action renders 




At least for Korsgaard’s version of the practical interpretation, then, rational willing is 
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 The claim that this is Kant’s position is controversial, but New Kantians have found 
assertions that would seem to support their interpretation. A few lines farther along in the 
famous passage, for instance, we get this: “It is one and the same thing to conceive of 
something as an effect that is possible in a certain way through me and to conceive of 
myself as acting in the same way with regard to the aforesaid effect.” Ibid. As I said, the 
strength of their interpretation of Kant is not my concern. 
 
68
 Korsgaard, Self-Constitution, 77. The emphasis is hers. 
 
69
 Ibid., 40. 
 
70
 Ibid., 83. 
 
71
 Ibid., 83-84. 
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willing success itself and not simply confirming the correctness of one’s causal analysis 
in a maxim. Korsgaard’s claims about self-constitution are her own, but the analysis of 
the hypothetical imperative—and with it the underlying notion of intention—is a core 
component of the practical interpretation more generally. Thus, New Kantians will 
endorse it.
72
 Having an intention is not just expecting success; it is committing to 
succeeding. One simply does not see New Kantians considering the possibility that 
volition or intention might be more complex, nor any investigation of how such 
complexity would influence our understanding of the Hypothetical Imperative, and that is 
not so surprising; for they inherit the bivalent picture of volition from the previous 
generation’s work in both moral and practical philosophy. 
Of course, the New Kantians do not turn a blind eye to the reality that individuals 
often experience a change of heart about their final ends. They can and will acknowledge 
that we abandon goals. Their explanation for that phenomenon is that our desires are 
arational: that is what comes and goes, yet psychological considerations do not enter into 
evaluating the rationality of an intention. On the New Kantian account, a rational 
intention involves expecting success, both in terms of causal analysis and obligation. 
Psychological predictions do not matter. Both the individual and the universal intention 
are evaluated as subject to the success condition.
73
 My concerns with the practical 
interpretation address this issue directly. 
 The classic example of a contradiction in conception cited in the literature is the 
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 For a confirmation from O’Neill, see “Consistency in Action,” 311. For Herman, see 
“Moral Deliberation,” 138. 
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 For a Kantian version, see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 




case of deceitful promising. For the sake of variety, I’m going to lay out an analogous but 
novel case. Let’s suppose an individual considers the following maxim: “Never pay 
taxes, for the sake of living a more privileged lifestyle.” Tax evasion promises greater 
privilege to all economic classes. For some, that translates into nicer clothing and better 
food. For others, it means luxury condominiums and the furnishings to go with it. 
Universalizing the maxim, we get: “No one pays taxes, for the sake of a more privileged 
lifestyle.” Following the New Kantians’ account of intention, we are led to the conclusion 
that this maxim is impermissible, since in a world where no one pays taxes, governmental 
protection of the citizenry fails. Economic, political, and social institutions soon follow, 
and as a result the economic status of every individual is undermined. Where 
governmental services and protections are unavailable, no one gets a more privileged 
lifestyle. In the UC-world, tax evasion is not a means to the end. On the practical 
interpretation, the contradiction arises because the individual’s proposed course of action 
ceases to be an actual means to the end in the universalized context. Furthermore, if we 
don’t expect success, we can’t commit to it.  
By locating contradictions in conception in the fact that a proposed action fails to 
be a means to the end, the practical interpretation construes the test as a question of an 
agent’s adherence to the Hypothetical Imperative. That determination is underwritten by 
a concept of intention in which achieving one’s goals is at the core of an agent’s practical 
stance. The problems that arise relate to the action in question, not the end. Thus, the CC 
test functions as a way of evaluating particular actions. Later, when we look at the 




Critiquing the Contradiction in Conception Test 
The problem with the New Kantian proposal is that we do not fully commit to 
achieving the goals of our long-term intentions. Such intentions, then, are not even 
candidates for undergoing the CI-procedure. We can perform a causal analysis of our 
plans to confirm that they would succeed if we were to follow through, but that doesn’t 
amount to a thorough-going commitment. More importantly, since our intentions are not 
like those demanded by the practical interpretation of the CC test, the evaluation rendered 
by it is irrelevant to their rational or moral status.  
Of course, final ends are the organizing principles of our short- and long-term 
plans. This is true even though long-term intentions are partial practical commitments. 
Our experiences generate change in our practical attitudes over time: life ambitions alter 
in a normally lived life. We change over time, and that means our practical perspective is 
evolving. We mature, both as persons and as human beings. For this reason, the majority 
of long-term goals we take up at different points in our lives do not survive the inevitable 
transitions we experience. That’s just a natural fact about us.  
To be clear, coming to see that long-term goals are partial commitments does not 
entail that no long-term goals endure. Some individuals hold onto core goals over 
extensive periods, but enduring goals are relatively few in comparison with the many that 
get put aside. Indeed, core commitments are often one of the reasons we have for walking 
away from other aims: people usually can’t get everything they want. It’s not impossible 
that a little girl will become a ballerina when she grows up, but the chances are pretty 
low. We do expect—and we should expect—to abandon the majority of long-term goals 
we pursue at one time or another. 
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We underestimate the frequency with which we abandon long-term goals because 
we tend to walk away from one goal or a small cluster of goals at a time, leaving a much 
larger set of ends in place. Most of us need and want a sense of continuity over time; we 
rely on it as a source of self-understanding. Because that’s so, we focus on what remains 
stable and motivationally important. The concerns and interests that get left behind fall 
out of consideration.  
More importantly, acknowledging the partiality of long-term commitment does 
not undermine the presence of real commitment to pursuing our current long-term goals 
for now. The observation that the investment is not absolute reinforces the fact that the 
motivational significance of long-term goals is grounded by present practical attitudes. 
Long-term goals and plans portray how one’s current concerns and interests are supposed 
to turn out. And this explains why active long-term goals play a crucial role in present 
deliberation: we use them as the frame for managing our present practical agenda. Given 
the authenticity of our present commitments, that makes sense. There will be a payoff, 
either in terms of moving one closer to a final end that remains motivationally significant 
or in terms of realizing that pursuing the goal is unsatisfying. If the latter turns out to be 
true, one gets valuable information about how one’s interests have changed. Both 
outcomes are practically valuable. 
The lesson to learn is that—contrary to the New Kantian assumption—having a 
rational long-term intention does not require a thorough-going commitment to achieving 
the end. Because we cannot say antecedently which goals will get put aside, this is a 
general feature of long-term intention. We pursue them in the present without requiring 
the expectation of success.  
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If success is not a criterion for forming an intention, it shouldn’t enter into 
evaluating the rationality of the intention. Willing an end certainly requires agents to will 
the means, but since we have only an abortive stake in the outcome of our long-term 
plans, we cannot and do not presume that we will achieve them. Thus, the success 
condition is not a legitimate condition of rational long-term intending.
74
 Given this 
conclusion, individuals don’t need to concern themselves with the results of the New 
Kantian CC test with respect to long-term goals. Returning to the maxim of tax evasion, 
recall that—on the practical interpretation—it was impermissible because, where tax 
evasion is a universal law, individual tax evasion is no longer a means to the end of 
gaining privilege. Its impermissibility, however, is not just about failing the causal 
analysis. It’s impermissible because it is irrational to embrace the intention, and that is a 
function of the fact that one will not succeed. Failing the causal analysis is simply a sign 
of the deeper problem inherent in the maxim.  
When we use the practical CC test to assess the actual intentions involved in 
having long-term goals, no practical contradiction arises. It should be apparent that it 
isn’t necessary to explain the psychology behind abandoning a goal. The argument I just 
gave actually concludes that partiality is a general feature of long-term intention. Still, 
filling in the details of the example may help clarify the point. In reality, tax evasion 
appeals for a while, but the majority of people who adopt this maxim will come to think 
that their quality of life is good enough and that the continuing risk of getting caught isn’t 
worth it. Given that greater privilege does not turn out to be an enduring goal for 
everyone, we can’t conclude that the maxim won’t be a successful means-end strategy for 
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 This objection is not directed at the question of whether universalizability is the mark 
of rationality. It is about what to test in matters of rationality.  
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any individual in the UC-world. If everyone is a free rider, then the socioeconomic 
system will fail; but such systems can and do survive with some free riders. There’s 
evidence for that readily available: take present-day Italy. That system hasn’t broken 
down yet. 
Universalizing partial commitment produces a world in which the end is not 
universally realized, and so, more often than not, one’s individual maxim continues to be 
a means to the end. In evaluating our actual long-term intentions—intentions in which 
there is no general expectation of success—the practical CI-procedure is too permissive. 
It is not a viable tool for adjudicating their rational or moral value. 
It will not be possible to sideline these considerations about long-term goals, 
which are typically what matter most to people. I’ve suggested that the reason for that is 
not primarily our investment in a future outcome. Thinking about the future helps us 
determine what to do in the present, but whatever the reason is, final ends are a 
fundamental part of our practical identity. The fact that our practical identity evolves over 
time does not alter that fact. So deliberation about long-term goals is central to our 
deliberative practices. Abandoning them does not make them wishes or hopes: we don’t 
actively pursue those things at all.  
 
Hedging Bets and the Hypothetical Imperative 
There is a way to articulate my concerns by focusing directly on the Hypothetical 
Imperative (HI). I quoted the famous passage earlier, but I’ll repeat it here. “Whoever 
wills the end, wills (so far as reason has decisive influence on his actions) also the means 
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that are indispensably necessary to his actions and that lie in his power.”75 The New 
Kantians read this passage as saying that willing the end just is committing to achieving 
the end. Leaving the notion of practical commitment unanalyzed, it might seem that this 
is the only way to read the passage. One might think that willing the means can be a 
rational necessity for an agent only if achieving the end is a practical necessity—where 
the force of “practical necessity” is a full commitment. According to this reading, the 
success condition does follow from the Hypothetical Imperative.  
It presumably never occurred to the New Kantians to consider the variability of 
practical commitments. Thus, there was no philosophical motivation to look for another 
reading of the HI. And there was not any reason to develop a way of talking about actions 
that would register partial commitments. Having brought them to light, there is another 
interpretation of the Hypothetical Imperative available: the partial commitment involved 
in long-term intention makes the Hypothetical Imperative binding. If you will an end, 
then you must will the means. That is true even if we make no assumptions about success 
or whether a present commitment will endure. Failure to meet this lesser demand does 
and should meet with criticism. If, in the prime of life, one intends to retire at 65 and yet 
does not actively save for it, that person is acting irrationally. It may well be that people 
on the verge of retirement have trouble walking away from work, not wanting to feel 
useless or bored. They often decide to continue on the job for a while longer. That does 
not excuse a current failure to act in accordance with the goal. So the Hypothetical 
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Imperative is binding on willing as such.
76
  
The contradiction in conception test is usually seen as more crucial than the 
contradiction in the will test because it adjudicates particular actions. The argument thus 
far presents reasons to reject the practical interpretation of it. Practical commitment to 
final ends is not wholesale, and so our long-term intentions are not subject to the 
expectation of success. It follows that the practical version of the CC test does not get a 
grip on long-term decision-making.  
 
Critiquing the Contradiction in the Will Test 
The point I have been making about long-term intention will have consequences for 
the practical interpretation of the contradiction in the will (CW) test as well. Whereas my 
argument in relation to the CC test led us to reexamine the force of the Hypothetical 
Imperative, we will find that these considerations press us toward reconsidering the 
commitment we make to being effective agents, and perhaps changing our views about 
what sort of ends we can rationally embrace.  
Let’s start by reviewing the interpretation.  The CW test assesses an agent’s ends 
and purposes. The basic procedure is the same as the CC test, but evaluation centers on 
whether success, both individual and universal, brings about a rationally acceptable 
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 There are, of course, a number of ways to read the Hypothetical Imperative. I want to 
distinguish my suggestion above from one in particular. It is a possibility that, despite the 
reality of partial practical commitment, agents deliberate about actions as if they were 
making a full commitment to the end in the interest of deliberative simplicity. On this 
reading, the practical CI-procedure would produce practical contradictions in just the way 
the New Kantians predict. Questions about the degree of one’s commitment would be put 
aside as a separate deliberative consideration. The New Kantians would get the results 
they want, but the significance of a contradiction would be conditional upon one’s actual 
level of commitments. This is not the proposal I am recommending.  
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outcome. The question asked is whether willing to live in the UC-world created by one’s 
maxim would be rational. The force of the question centers on whether we would be 
sacrificing something by living there. In particular, we are to focus on whether our ability 
to pursue and achieve ends would be diminished. The New Kantians assume, perhaps 
controversially, that rational agents must have the goal of maintaining the efficacy of 
their agential abilities. Any maxim that greatly undermines those powers in its UC-world 
creates a conflict with that goal and therefore must be rejected.
 77
  
Suppose one is considering the maxim of living fast and dying young. 
Universalization of intentions—understood on the model accepted by the New 
Kantians—produces a world in which everyone does. In such a world, no one plans for 
the future, no one saves for the future, and no governmental or social institutions are put 
in place to safeguard future security and well-being. Individuals living in such a world 
will eventually find themselves in need of resources that they cannot produce in a timely 
fashion, and there will be no outside resources on which to draw. Living in a world where 
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 If you are operating under the assumption that intentions manifest a full commitment to 
achieving your ends, it’s obvious that you cannot will to live in a world in which your 
ability to succeed would diminish. However, even if the commitment you make to your 
goals is not always full-blooded, you will continue to pursue a wide variety of ends, and 
you will want to succeed. Whether you walk away from them later doesn’t change the 
desire to succeed in pursuing them. Thus, the partiality of practical commitment doesn’t 
undermine a commitment to agential efficacy. Generally speaking, human agents will 
resist any outcome that would imperil future success. I say “generally” because there 
might be certain circumstances where agents might choose to abandon maintaining 
agential power. For instance, some terminal patients seek to put an end to the discomfort 
of their illnesses, and there is an excellent case to be made for doing so. In Sources of 
Normativity, Korsgaard seems to acknowledge that there are legitimate grounds for 
suicide in cases of this sort. Korsgaard, Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: University 
Press, 1996), 160-164. Her official philosophical position, however, forces her to reject 
that claim, and she confirms that in Self-Constitution: “We owe it to ourselves, to our 
own humanity, to find some roles that we can fill with integrity and dedication. But in 
acknowledging that, we commit ourselves to the value of our humanity just as such.” 
Korsgaard, Self-Constitution, 24-25.  
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neither individuals nor society in general stockpile resources, our capacity as agents 
would be seriously threatened. We cannot will to live in such a world because it 
contradicts a prior commitment to agential efficacy. According to the New Kantians, we 
must reject the maxim.  
The function of the success condition in the CW test is not as transparent, but as 
the same view of intention is operative, we should expect the same kinds of problems to 
emerge. Recognizing that long-term intentions do not involve a full commitment to 
achieving them, universalizing them does not reveal anything decisive. Without any 
expectation that a maxim’s purpose will be fully realized, the claim that one’s capacities 
as an agent would be threatened is no longer plausible. Many maxims will come up 
looking risky or foolish, but no volitional contradiction will arise.  
The problem with the CW test is that—just as in the case of the CC test—
universalization gets traction as an evaluative measure only if we assume that agents 
expect to achieve all of their purposes and remain committed to them for the duration. 
That assumption is false. We can think about the consequences of this in one of two 
ways. On the first approach, we carry out the CW test using the traditional account of 
intention that the New Kantians endorse. On the second, we treat long-term intentions as 
partial commitments. On the first alternative, agents carry out the test with the 
presumption that individual and universal maxims represent full commitments. The 
maxim of living fast and dying young turns out to be impermissible: where everyone 
seizes the day without preparing or planning for tomorrow, there are no resources 
available to manage emergencies or our natural decline as we get older. This is an 
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unacceptable sacrifice of our capacity as agents.
78
  
Such an outcome, however, doesn't apply to our long-term intentions. They are 
not subject to the success condition. To the extent that the CI-procedure imposes that 
assumption, the results don’t provide a fair assessment of our intentions. So there’s no 
reason to take the outcome seriously.  
On the second approach to applying the CW test, we trade the New Kantian 
notion of intention for a conception of long-term intention that allows them to be partial 
commitments. We evaluate a UC-world in which everyone takes up the policy of living 
fast and dying young but not everyone maintains the policy for the duration. 
Universalizing that maxim produces a world in which the end is not fully realized. The 
perceived threat to our capacity as agents, that is, the worry that we would find ourselves 
in need of unavailable resources, is not a serious worry. In a world like that, the maxim of 
living fast and dying young might seem foolish on balance, but it doesn’t produce 
volitional contradiction. Living fast and dying young appeals to those of us who have not 
yet felt the touch of mortality. Most of us live fast when we’re young and slow down as 
we get older, turning our attention to planning and saving for the future, as well as 
supporting social institutions that will serve us as we become less able.
79
  
No matter which account of intention we use in working through the CW test, it is 
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 Of course, we can predict that most people who take up the maxim of living fast and 
dying young will give it up before they actually succeed. But this consideration is not 
relevant to the New Kantian account of rational intention; for them, it is the consequence 
of the instability of human desire. 
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 I pointed out in an earlier footnote that my argument doesn’t require showing there are 
psychological reasons backing decisions to abandon long-term goals. The partiality of 
commitment is a general feature of long-term intentions. This holds true here as well. 
Again, filling in the story merely helps motivate the point. 
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no longer the kind of tool that the New Kantians need it to be. Just as we saw with the CC 
test, the CW test fails because its presuppositions do not get a grip on our practical 
commitments. The upshot is that the envisaged procedure is, frequently enough, 
deliberatively useless for us. Either it doesn’t matter for our thinking about what to do, or 
it doesn’t provide any determinate results.  
I wrote earlier that the New Kantian interpretation of the CW test operated on the 
assumption that, as agents, we are committed to our own efficacy. For them, efficacy 
means achieving one’s goals. It’s a widespread assumption, but it isn’t obvious that we 
have to understand efficacy in these terms. My arguments open the door to considering 
alternatives. People don’t treat achieving their goals as the only dimension worth caring 
about in either decision or action. Thus, performing well—and so meeting some standard 
of efficacy—is not merely a function of achieving goals for us. The reason we see our 
lives as centering on long-term goals is that they orient us within a more locally defined 
range of acting and being.  
Take vanity as an example. We all have it, but different long-term goals are more 
or less permissive about expressing it, and we manage it in terms of the long-term goals 
we have. In the hipster world, being vain is a critical characteristic. Although the rules are 
not crystal clear, you won’t be all that hip without letting people know about how cool 
you are. At the same time, certain kinds of self-promotion are unacceptable. For example, 
being hip forbids telling people about how cool you are; you have to make it clear in how 
you act. In the business world, however, matters are entirely different: if you’re not 
telling people exactly why you’re better than the next guy, you’re doing it wrong. Long-
term goals can change, and that means the way you make these decisions will change as 
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well. Until they do, the long-term considerations presently in view help to determine the 
decisions that need to get made now.  
Negotiating local decision-making is a practical priority. If we cannot manage the 
short term, there is no call to trying to control the distant future. Our efficacy as agents is 
therefore tied to an ability to manage local circumstances. Long-term goals and plans 
support us in our attempts to do exactly that, but success in this context can be measured 
without taking account of whether we achieve the goals in the long run. Thus we satisfy a 
primary criterion of effective agency through the successful pursuit of short-term goals. 
On this account of efficacy, the commitment we make to long-term goals plays a 
distinctive role in becoming efficacious agents in the here and now.  
 
Distinguishing Prioritization and Practical Identities 
Until now, the focus of this chapter has been using my claims about practical 
commitment to critique the practical interpretation and the underlying view of intention. I 
want to switch gears now and return to my account of self-directed prioritization. In 
particular, I want to distinguish my notion of a practical ideal from Korsgaard’s notion of 
practical identity. Because she employs the construct in addressing the prioritization 
problem, there is at least a superficial similarity to my account. Clarifying the differences 
will show that her account faces problems with respect to prioritization.  
Korsgaard introduces her account of practical identity in Sources of Normativity.
80
 
Her thought is that, when an agent endorses a principle of choice, it provides a basis for 
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having a conception of oneself.  
When you deliberate, it is as if there were something over and above all of your 
desires, something which is you, and which chooses which desire to act on. This 
means that the principle or law by which you determine your actions is one that you 




Practical self-understanding, then, is a function of one’s principle of choice. A practical 
identity is a description expressing that principle. Since we endorse a number of long-
term principles at any given time, Korsgaard sees us as operating with a number of 
practical identities. These set the terms for determining what other maxims an individual 
can or will endorse. Our obligation to uphold the underlying principle of a practical 
identity varies with the level of commitment. Deep commitments represent unconditional 
obligations because “to violate them is to lose your integrity and so your identity, and to 
no longer be who you are.”82 
Korsgaard’s practical identities perform two deliberative functions. In one sense, 
they are simply special instances of maxims for action. For example, identifying with the 
principle of being a good mother is to act as a good mother for the sake of (let’s say) 
raising happy children. In this capacity, practical identities are subject to the Hypothetical 
and Categorical Imperatives. However, practical identities also guide decision with 
respect to more local courses of action. Thus, being a good mother prohibits one from 
making social engagements on most evenings.  
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 Ibid., 102. Entering into substantive ethics at this point, Korsgaard claims that human 
agents must be committed to the practical identity of being human. We are to understand 
this as a commitment to being a Citizen in the Kingdom of Ends. Of course, this is a 
controversial moral conclusion, and it has been scrutinized in the literature from the 
beginning. Because the issues don’t speak to the question of prioritization, I’m not going 
to address them.  
71 
 
There are conspicuous differences between Korsgaard’s practical identities and 
my practical ideal. For me, one’s plans and goals come together to form a unified self-
conception. There are varying degrees of commitment to different goals, but we commit 
independently to having a practical ideal.
83
 The calculative structure of one’s ideal does 
the work of setting priorities. Thus on my account, there is no call to assess which goals 
manifest a more thorough-going commitment, and priorities are not a function of 
upholding certain obligations. Self-directed prioritization evades the need to make such 
evaluations. In contrast, Korsgaard’s strategy is to rank practical identities by measure of 
the strength of commitment or obligation. So her account recalls the failures of 
preference ranking and identification. It will come as no surprise, then, that similar 
problems arise here as well. 
One thing to notice about Korsgaard’s account of practical identity is that there is 
a tension between it and the CI-procedure of the practical interpretation. Given her 
understanding of intention, identifying with a description—a special case of a principle of 
action—amounts to a full commitment to acting in accordance with that description. Seen 
as practical identities, however, commitment is taken as a variable. Korsgaard tells us that 
individuals put less important commitments aside for a time in order to uphold deeper, 
more important ones. As long as one doesn’t walk away too often or for too long, it 
doesn’t undermine an ongoing commitment to achieving these subordinate ends.  
However, that doesn’t resolve the tension. For Korsgaard, it is acting in the 
pursuit of one’s ends that constitutes you as the person you are. It follows that if you give 
up pursuing an end, even temporarily, you no longer identify yourself through the pursuit 
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of that end. In order for practical identities to resolve deliberative conflict, however, we 
will have to walk away from some of them in order to choose a course of action. If she 
maintains the claim that the agent continues to be the same person, then it’s not acting in 
the pursuit of an end that makes you who you are. Rather, it’s committing to the end that 
does the work.  
Assuming that tension can be resolved, Korsgaard seeks to manage prioritization 
by measuring or monitoring the level of commitment one has made to one’s practical 
identities and by ranking them. Instead of measuring the strengths of desires, we exploit 
the relative strengths of our practical commitments. I have already argued that 
measurement strategies of this sort cannot solve the prioritization problem. I now want to 
suggest that Korsgaard’s hierarchy of commitment will not work either. The account 
assumes that practical commitment is a measurable psychological phenomenon and that 
our practical commitments are stable enough to produce priorities. There are reasons to 
doubt this. Moreover, concerns about incommensurability come up here as well.  
But the real problem for Korsgaard is that—were there a way to resolve these 
issues—the resulting organization of practical identities would undermine her conviction 
that we constitute ourselves through action. Regardless of what such agents do, their 
constitution as agents becomes a function of the hierarchical order of practical identities 
at any given time. It is the commitment to a particular hierarchy maintained over time 
that matters. This is because having the hierarchy is what generates priorities, and having 
priorities is a precondition of acting. In suggesting that we prioritize through a hierarchy 
of practical commitment, the idea that we constitute ourselves as agents in action gets 
lost. The only action that turns out to be decisive is the act of deliberating about the depth 
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of one’s commitments.84  
Perhaps these concerns are not decisive, but they serve to mark the contrast 
between my view and Korsgaard. Self-directed prioritization does not push the problem 
up to a higher-level psychological attitude. For we do not solve deliberative conflict 
through an analysis of the weight or intensity of desire, identification, or commitment. 
Self-directed prioritization solves the problem by appealing to the calculative framework 
of one’s plans. That structure can act as a tool for excluding options without moderating 
between disparate practical identities and commitments. Decision remains a function of 
one’s current values and goals, but it is not tied to ranking them. We expect our goals to 
change, and so the calculative framework we use to prioritize will alter as this happens. 
Choice is therefore tied to promoting our present overall ideal. Such actions serve a dual 
purpose. They move one toward an ideal, but they also test the authenticity of that ideal. 
Thus one’s sense of self is being constructed through action, not with the expectation that 
the final end will endure, but rather in a way that incorporates the transience of practical 
commitment. This perspective on questions of practical identity, decision, and action 
differs markedly from the kind of solution Korsgaard seems to have in mind.  
 
Conclusion 
Developing an objection to the New Kantian CI-procedure, this chapter has cast 
doubt on what is a central component of their ethical theory and the underlying account 
of practical rationality. Thus, in addition to presenting worries about this contemporary 
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then, is stable. As I suggested earlier, however, the will to be human does not impose an 
order on an individual’s other practical identities. Thus, it cannot solve deliberative 
problems with respect to prioritization.   
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version of Kantian moral philosophy, my arguments create a problem for the model of 
decision more generally. The primary target was the account of intention: I have shown 
that, because long-term intentions involve only partial commitment to achieving the final 
end, the New Kantian method of evaluating these intentions is not viable.  
Kantian moral philosophy is currently one of the three main positions in ethics, 
along with consequentialism and virtue-oriented accounts. Given its prominent place in 
contemporary debate, let me suggest some morals to draw. First, the conclusion I am 
offering is surprising in that Kantian theory is often taken to be the sole live alternative to 
consequentialism, according to which the moral value of an action is determined by its 
outcome. Rather than presenting an alternative to the consequentialist preoccupation with 
achieving ends, the practical interpretation of the CI-procedure shares an insufficiently 
critical focus on this notion of efficacy. The next lesson is that, as we pursue normative 
moral theory, we must pay closer attention to the many gradations of practical 
commitment. Third, a similar message applies to progress in the theory of practical 
rationality. Accounts of decision will have to incorporate the results of reexamining 
human commitment as well.  
We have also seen how the prioritization problem asserts itself in 
noninstrumentalist contexts. This is a gesture at illustrating the ubiquity of the problem, 
and so also the need to revise instrumental preconceptions about decision-making. 
Looking at yet another attempt to solve the problem and noticing that it follows the 








LIFE IS WHAT HAPPENS WHEN YOU’RE MAKING 
OTHER PLANS 
 
In 1401, the clergymen of Seville adopted a plan “to build a church so beautiful 
and so great that those who see it built will think we were mad.”85 This was the first step 
in a project that took 174 years to complete. It took 110 years to complete the main dome, 
at which point—in 1511—it promptly collapsed. Reconstruction took 8 years, and in 
1519, the builders began on its eighty chapels and the belfry. Having been built on the 
site of a mosque, they converted one of the minarets into a bell tower, “La Giralda,” 
standing next to the cathedral. The building was completed in 1575. At the time, it 
supplanted the Hagia Sophia in Istanbul as the largest church in the world, which had 
held the honor for over a 1,000 years. It is the largest Gothic building in Europe.
86
 
Building that cathedral was a big action. For action theorists such as Michael 
Thompson, however, size doesn’t matter for the philosophical analysis of an action. 
Inspired by the work of G.E.M Anscombe, Thompson is at the head of a recent 
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movement bringing action theory to bear on practical reasoning.
87
 He argues that the 
structure of action is what makes acting for reasons possible. Actions are events that 
unfold in time, exhibiting a part-whole structure.
88
 That structure underwrites our ability 
to understand the action’s unity as an event, and it is also the basis for an agent 
explaining and justifying what he or she is doing.
89
 By Thompson’s lights, the action of 
building the Cathedral consisted of smaller action-parts. That arrangement of parts is the 
ground for calling a 174 year project a single action, and familiarity with the structure 
explains what took place in carrying the action out. 
I’ll be arguing that Thompson’s account fails to provide an adequate analysis of 
how we deliberate about action. My focus will be the observation that deliberation about 
action is itself a process in which we continually revise and update our conception of the 
action. Large-scale actions, like building a cathedral, help to make that fact conspicuous. 
When you spend 174 years building a cathedral, your conception of the part-whole 
structure of the action changes as you go. Innumerable complexities and problems will 
arise, and they will require replacing the current draft of the part-whole structure with a 
new one. In the case of Seville’s cathedral, for example, the collapse of the main dome 
was not present in the representation of the action for the first 110 years. So it was not an 
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“providing a reason” for doing it. For stylistic purposes, I will, for the most part, follow 
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element of the particular action that both architects and workers had in view, and it could 
not have played any explanatory role until after it happened. After the fact, the act of 
building Seville’s cathedral had to accommodate it. This is a problem for Thompson, 
since on his view, altering the part-whole structure of an action fractures its unity. Thus, 
as representational drafts of the action succeed one another, we end up with a pile of 
abandoned actions associated with past drafts. We only get a fully complete 
representation of the action at the end of it, and that cannot be what guides activity in the 
initial stages.  
Daniel Dennett made a similar point about perception in his book, Consciousness 
Explained. He argued that the constant influx of sensory information undergoes “editorial 
revision.” There is no “theater of the mind” where the mind’s eye views a fully 
completed movie that is the individual’s conscious experience. Rather, the final draft is 
produced retrospectively, once all the incoming data is received.
90
 So it is with action: we 
rarely get a whole action right on the first try, even when it comes to actions of modest 
complexity. So as agents, we have to work through multiple drafts of an action as we go.  
I am going to work through this argument against Thompson because it provides 
another perspective on the issues surrounding practical commitment. I have been arguing 
in previous chapters that practical commitment is an independent consideration in 
deliberation; its influence on decision is separate from preference, desire, identification, 
intention, and planning. Turning to action-theoretic work, I’ll be making a similar claim 
about belief. Acting and deliberating successfully do not require a thorough-going 
commitment to any particular belief we have about an action.  
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This works as a refutation of Thompson’s view. But Thompson and the other 
action theorists pride themselves on their antipsychologism. Their aim is to provide an 
account of practical reasoning that diminishes the role of arational elements in 
deliberation. So the conclusion that we must incorporate an account of practical 
commitment into an acceptable account of practical rationality will be especially 
unwelcome for them. Once that argument is in place, I will turn to the prioritization 
problem once again, and we will see that Thompson’s account faces difficulties here as 
well.  
This conclusion is the last step of my argument that instrumental structure cannot 
stand alone as the centerpiece of our practical psychology. I began this project by looking 
at a model of our practical psychology due to Bernard Williams. I noted at the time that 
the model presupposed not only the centrality of the instrumental structure in our 
practical psychology, but also the role that instrumental reasoning plays in deliberation. I 
have been slowly chipping away at these assumptions throughout this work. Having 
examined desire, intention, means-end reasoning as well as planning, I am now taking 
aim at the final element of an instrumentally-based model of practical psychology, that is, 
belief. In doing so, I have put myself in a position to conclude that, taken by itself, 
instrumental structure cannot manage deliberation and decision effectively. The issues 
concerning practical commitment are too complex for the instrumental model to handle 
by itself. So while instrumental structure is central to our practical psychology, it cannot 





Arguing for the Primacy of Action-theoretic Explanation 
I’ll begin with an overview of Thompson’s position. Action-theoretic views of 
practical reasoning hold that the explanation and justification of action invoke the 
features of action, appealing to its event-like, part-whole structure. Rationalizing a 
particular action locates it within the frame of a larger, unfolding action: “I am laying this 
stone because I am building a wall.” We can repeat the form of explanation, further 
embedding this explanation within another: “I’m building a wall because I’m building a 
cathedral.” 91  
The view initially looks similar to instrumentalism, and there is good reason for it. 
Action theorists are “inspired by the idea of unearthing the foundation of instrumentalist 
views, the buried but sensible source of current doctrine.”92 However, there are 
significant differences. Whereas instrumentalism explains actions by appeal to the 
psychological states of the individual, Thompson rejects that view. And while 
instrumentalists justify an action by showing it to be a means to a given end, he will 
reject this claim as well. He argues that appeal to the structure of an action is logically 
prior to gestures at psychological attitudes or purposes. So it follows that beliefs about 
one’s action do the work in both explanation and justification. “The so-called belief 
component is all-important. For it contains the consideration upon which the agent acts in 
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doing A, that is, the thing that is more properly or narrowly called the ‘reason’ … upon 
which her doing of A is founded.”93 As a first approximation, then, we can understand 
Thompson’s work as arguing against instrumentalists about what comes first, action-
theoretic reasoning or means-end reasoning.  
Making the case for the primacy of action theory requires showing that agents can 
offer action-theoretic rationalizations for all intentional actions. This means establishing 
that every intentional action can be understood as a part of some larger action, and that 
every intentional action can be broken down into smaller parts.
94
 Because agents use an 
action’s structure to explain as well as reason about what they are doing, they must be 
able to see the entire trajectory of their actions at the outset. That isn’t to say that every 
detail of an action be fully figured out; we fill in later details as we go. Still, we must be 
able to see the action as a whole from the beginning.
95
  
This first stage of Thompson’s argument shows that action theory can precede 
instrumental reasoning about what we are doing. The next stage takes on the question of 
whether in fact it does precede means-end reasoning about action. His tack is to argue 
that thinking about action must track the metaphysics of action, and that this 
consideration precedes any other that might enter into our practical reasoning. Intentional 
                                                     
93
 Thompson, “Naïve Action Theory,” 93. 
 
94
 Thompson’s argument for this has been controversial because it has the startling 
consequence that every intentional action is divisible into smaller intentional actions. So 
he is embracing the idea of infinitely small intentional actions, and he denies the 
existence of indivisible or atomic actions. Cases like raising one’s arm, or impulsively 
winking at a stranger are divisible actions on this account. The claim seems implausible, 
and the success of Thompson’s arguments have been called into question. Since it is not 
directly relevant to my own concerns, I’m not going to focus on it here. 
 
95
 See Thompson, Life and Action, 107-8, as well as footnote 3 on page 108. 
81 
 
actions are events, so he begins by looking at forms of thought relevant to that category. 
For Thompson, the most important feature about events is that we describe them in terms 
of “grammatical aspect.” In order to get clear about what that is, I will start by comparing 
it to the more familiar notion of grammatical tense. The tense of a sentence indicates 
where the statement is in time, i.e., past, present, or future. Aspect, in contrast, expresses 
how something is to be viewed in time. Supposing that I have just arrived at the library, I 
am in a position to describe the journey I made to get here. On the one hand, I can speak 
about that journey as a completed event: “I walked to the library,” or “I have walked to 
the library.” On the other hand, I can describe the walk as something not yet finished by 
saying, “I was walking to the library.” Thus, events can be represented either as complete 
or incomplete within time. Grammarians talk about these possibilities as either “perfect” 
or “imperfect.” When presenting an event as complete, it takes on a perfective aspect; 
when incomplete, it takes an imperfective aspect.  
As a way of clarifying the concept, and as an additional premise in Thompson’s 
argument, states—in particular psychological states—do not take grammatical aspect. 
Something either is or is not in the state of being red. Redness is not a process that 
unfolds. An object that was red might become blue, and of course, that transition would 
be an event. We can talk about the transition perfectively or imperfectively, but the 
features of that event do not apply to the distinct states. Analogously, someone either 
does or does not want to go to the library. Being undecided is not the same as being in the 
process of going from one state to the other. Making that transition would be an event, 
but being in one state or another is not. 
Since thought about action takes either perfective or imperfective aspect, we need 
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to consider the entailment relations for each type of statement. Perfective statements 
imply their imperfective correlates, but the converse is not true. When “I walked to the 
library” is true, a statement with imperfective aspect, “I was walking to the library,” will 
also be true. However, if it’s true that I was walking to the library, it does not follow that 
I made it there. The smell of fresh roasted coffee beans coming from the café might have 
tempted me into studying there for the afternoon.  
The example I just used is in the past tense. Things are more complicated in the 
present. In English, for instance, we can speak imperfectively of present action, but we 
cannot speak perfectively of it. “I am walking to the library” is fine, but there is no 
correlate for describing a present action as being complete. It might look as if “I walk to 
the library” conveys perfective aspect, but it doesn’t. Statements of this sort make claims 
about habitual actions; “I walk to the library” means that it is a routine activity. So it 
doesn’t refer to a particular event at all. “I walk to the library” doesn’t entail that you are 
doing it right now, and the fact that you are walking to the library today does not imply 
that you do it frequently. Moving from one expression to the other is simply changing the 
subject.
96
   
The crucial observation for Thompson is that, whereas grammatical aspect is an 
essential element of action-theoretic explanations, the psychologistic rationalizations of 
instrumental explanations do not appear to convey it. This is because psychological 
attitudes are states and do not possess aspect. In, “I am walking to the library because I 
want to study,” the wanting looks like it is picking out a state. States are not processes, 
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and so they do not have aspectual features. Thompson wants us to see that the facts about 
grammatical aspect reveal that the two propositions in that statement are of different 
logical types. That observation speaks in favor of casting action-theoretic explanation as 
logically prior to the instrumental form because it is of the same logical type as thought 
about action more generally.  
Thompson has another argument to make against his instrumentalist opponent, 
but it calls for a change in the way I’ve been framing the discussion. Up to this point, I 
have been characterizing the issue as a choice between two kinds of rationalization of 
action, and we were figuring out which was more fundamental. That’s not quite right. For 
Thompson, there aren’t two fully distinct ways of rationalizing an action. There is only 
one: the action-theoretic kind. Taking a closer look at instrumental rationalizations, he 
argues that, while they initially seem to refer to an agent’s psychological attitudes, they 
aren’t actually doing so. The “wanting,” “intending,” and “trying” we encounter in 
instrumental explanations are really cloaked gestures at aspectual features of the action in 
question. They convey how far along one is in the performance of an action. Thus, 
instrumental explanations actually do convey the imperfective aspect of actions. 
Explanations like, “I’m building this pillar because I want to support the roof” don’t refer 
to an orectic attitude. Rather, they signal how far along the agent is in the action of 
supporting the roof. An agent offering this explanation is in the preliminary stages of the 
action. Thompson’s main conclusion, then, is that action-theoretic rationalization isn’t 
merely logically prior to its instrumental counterpart because instrumental rationalization 
just is action-theoretic. If the argument works, Thompson doesn’t defeat his opponent, he 
makes her disappear. 
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The argument focuses on the psychologistic explanans, “I want to support the 
roof.” He points out that, while “wanting” is taken to be a propositional attitude, it isn’t 
modifying a proposition in this case; it’s modifying a verb phrase. Most philosophers 
have assumed that such statements are the result of semantic elision, the complete form 
being “I want that I support the roof.”97 However, if that were the case, the embedded 
proposition would not convey the correct sense. “I support the roof” conveys an habitual 
activity and not a particular action. That proposition cannot replace the verb phrase 
without changing the meaning of the sentence. Thus, the orthodoxy is incorrect: “I want 
to support the roof” cannot be analyzed in this way. For Thompson, this shows that, in 
the case of action explanation, wanting, intending, and trying are not propositional 
attitudes. 
This conclusion makes an alternative analysis of the form of action explanation 
possible, and Thompson supposes that the wanting, intending and trying of action 
explanations is expressing where in the performance of an action one is at the time of 
explanation.  
If the distinction between imperfective and perfective modes of “inexistence” of an 
event- or process-form can be said to be “founded deep in the nature of things,”… 
then “try”, “intend”, and “want” merely express some of the ways in which a bearer 





The supposedly psychological terms in instrumental rationalization actually communicate 
                                                     
97
 Thompson points out a number of theorists who oppose the propositional assumption, 
and explicitly ties his account to the work of Annette Baier. See Thompson, Life and 
Action, 120-22; for references, see note 1 on pages 120-21. 
 
98
 Thompson, Life and Action, 131. 
85 
 
that the action is still in progress, and so express the imperfective aspect of the action.
99
 
Thompson concludes on this basis that there is only the appearance of a contrast between 
action-theoretic and instrumental forms of explanation. On his view, both types of 
explanations situate an action within a larger action in a part-whole relationship. It is in 
this way that we can understand his claim that it is only by being agents who can offer 





Destabilizing Action-theoretic Explanation 
Many actions are well-suited to the action-theoretic model. The most persuasive 
cases are highly scripted actions. In theater productions, for example, everything the 
actors do on stage is predetermined. Surgeons performing complex surgeries require 
years of training because the correct sequence and timing of the procedure is crucial. And 
astronauts train for every moment of their extravehicular activity, i.e., space-walking. 
When something goes wrong, the agent gets back to the script as quickly as possible, and 
this is just as the Thompsonian model would recommend. Mistakes on stage aren’t a 
jumping off point for reimagining one’s character. When complications arise in surgery, 
doctors fix the problem and return to the proper procedure. And to the extent possible, 
nothing unexpected happens on a space-walk. The structure of the action is non-
negotiable; thus deliberation and performance adhere as closely as possible to them.  
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There are reasons to think, however, that Thompson’s account cannot underwrite 
our thinking about a great many other kinds of activities. In many contexts, we cannot or 
do not want to regulate what we are doing to that extent. The way we assert control over 
different kinds of actions varies. We also miscalculate actions. In addition, we coordinate 
our actions, changing the plan as we go. Thoughts of efficiency, pleasure, or even 
spontaneity persuade us to change course. None of this is surprising, and that means we 
should expect the representational framework for determining our course of action to be 
dynamic. Unlike stage productions or space-walking, sometimes the best strategy is to 
throw the script away altogether. In such cases, one’s representation of an action evolves. 
Thus agents are acting on the basis of representational drafts that are being revised as 
they perform their actions.  
Thompson has trouble accommodating these considerations because—for him—
the initial representation is what unifies a series of parts into a single, whole action, and it 
is that representation providing the explanation and justification for what one is doing. In 
cases where that representation is evolving, however, Thompson’s model dictates that the 
action’s unity breaks down, and so the rationalization of one’s action loses its cohesion.  
Let’s return to Seville’s cathedral. No doubt the initial plan for such a project 
would have to be largely schematic, calling for the production of additional, more 
detailed versions of the plan later on. There’s no question, then, but that the architect 
synthesized the action over time through evolving drafts. This is not the issue I’m 
addressing. My objection is not about the need to specify an initially vague 
representation. I mean to be pointing out the need to either alter an action’s structure in 
crucial respects or abandon that structure for the sake of another. Above and beyond 
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matters of specification, the facts on the ground in Seville between 1401 and 1574 would 
have forced both architects and builders to abandon initial drafts of their plans and come 
up with new ones at various junctures. This is the way to describe what happened when 
the main dome collapsed. The whole project would inevitably have been revised from 
blueprint to interior decoration.  
On Thompson’s account, radical alteration of the representational ground for 
building Seville’s cathedral commits him to construing the project as a series of different 
actions rather than just one. For it is the agent’s current grasp of the place that laying a 
brick has in the action of building a wall that rationalizes the action. It’s one thing when 
the far end of what you’re doing hasn’t come cleanly into view. That’s not Thompson’s 
problem. Rather, it is that, when the action’s structure changes, rationalizations before 
and after the change appeal to different representations. The builders in Seville would 
have initially looked to a representation of building the cathedral that did not include 
rebuilding the main dome. After it happened, any representation of the act would have to 
include the collapse and subsequent repairs. Presumably, they would have drawn up an 
entirely new blueprint of the church. The emergence of this new draft signals the 
existence of a distinct action for Thompson because actions carried out under the 
direction of one representation cannot be unified with actions guided by a different one. 
Where an action’s unity falls away, rationalization bifurcates along the lines of the 
independent representations. Earlier stages of the performance now look like a pile of 
unconnected, independent actions that were abandoned along the way. They were false 
starts; actions related to cathedrals that never came into being.  
An account of practical reason will have to accommodate deliberative revision of 
88 
 
an action’s structure. This is not simply because we accept that building the cathedral of 
Seville was a whole action. Remember that Thompson’s aim was to reveal a deep unity 
underlying the variety of human activity, and to show that this unity could be discerned in 
the forms of our thought about action. Instead, we have lost our grip on the unity we 
already know is there. We are left with a pile of unfinished cathedrals and one completed 
cathedral, a “rush job” at the end. Thompson has shown that the part-whole structure of 
action is important, but we can’t help but notice that there are other considerations that 
matter: we usually can’t predict what we’re going to do precisely, and we can’t control 
what ends up happening entirely. The upshot for practical rationality is that the unity of 
our thought about action is not to be found in the representation of an action, but rather 
from a perspective in which there is unity over and above the various drafts we work 
through in performing an action.  
Thompson might think that there is a quick response to my worries. He might 
suggest that, in order to unify the action and the source of one’s explanation for action, 
we can simply conjoin the representations we produce in performing an action into one 
larger representation. Any alterations to the part-whole structure as well as the false starts 
get “glued” together. This kind of “super-representation” can do the work of guiding the 
agent through the act, while at the same time maintaining representational unity. The 
“super-action” that gets explained corresponds to everything included in the super-
representation.  
However, this is a mistake. There is no predicting false starts or a radical revision 
of an action’s parts. So the representation of either false starts or revision can only be 
conjoined to produce a super-representation of an action after the fact. Since they are put 
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together retrospectively, they cannot rationalize what one is doing as one is doing it.  
Taking the idea of a super-representation a bit further, Thompson could suggest 
that we start out with a schematic super-representation of our actions. Thus, agents act on 
the basis of a super-representation that leaves room for false starts and revision, and for 
specifying what happens in progress. Generating this super-representation happens at the 
beginning of an action, so it can rationalize what an agent is doing, and it maintains 
representational unity. Unfortunately, this option simply reproduces the original problem. 
Agents revise their thought about regular actions. The reason is that success on the first 
try isn’t the norm in managing actions. We should expect this to apply to super-actions as 
well. Even if a super-representation is schematic, agents will still have to revise them. 
Just as most regular actions require operating across a sequence of representational drafts, 
so too will super-actions necessitate a series of super-drafts. We can only produce an 
accurate super-representation of a super-action retrospectively. And that’s too late to 
rationalize anything during an action.  
Consider the efforts to contain the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. The first reports 
of leaking oil occurred on April 22, 2010. The scientists, engineers, and technicians did 
not stop the flow of oil until July 10, 2010. It took seven separate attempts to succeed in 
their efforts. The first six plans failed. After each failure, they scrambled to come up with 
a new strategy, and in fact, not even the first of these plans was in accordance with 
British Petroleum Corporation’s emergency procedures for such an event.101  
If we want to understand containing the oil spill as one action—and presumably 
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we do want that—we must conjoin these disparate efforts as parts to a whole. Doing so 
requires bringing together representations of the action that are not consistent with one 
another. The whole action, as it happened on the ground, doesn’t come cleanly into view 
until after the fact. That representation isn’t what guided the process of containment. And 
while it does explain things ex post facto, it isn’t doing explanatory work when the action 
was taking place.  
My objection to Thompson’s position emerged by looking at large scale, long-
term actions. But the point is not formally limited to such actions. The criticism I’ve 
presented applies to Thompson’s action-theoretic account of reasons for acting generally. 
We can and do revise actions of all sizes. The only reason they don’t exhibit as many 
false starts is because they are less complex and shorter in duration. Deliberative revision 
of our actions is the norm, not the exception in thinking about what we are doing. So, for 
instance, getting in my car to run to the grocery store, I’m planning on taking Fourth 
Street. Finding unexpected construction getting in my way, I take Sixth instead.  
I wrote earlier that I wanted to use my assessment of Thompson’s work to 
diagnose a more general tendency of philosophers working in practical rationality. 
Taking a step back and looking at Thompson and other action theorists from a broader 
perspective, we can characterize their project as an antipsychologistic variant on 
instrumental accounts of practical rationality. Their aim is to undercut the role of attitudes 
and dispositions in deliberation, while holding onto the deep insight about practical 
reasoning embodied in instrumentalism. On Thompson’s manner of speaking, the insight 
worth taking seriously is that actions are events displaying a process-form.  
The argument I have been developing against the account reveals a deeper 
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problem. Here again—as in the other accounts I have considered in the last two 
chapters—there is a presumption about the nature of practical commitment underwriting 
Thompson’s position. If he is right that deliberation about an action centers on a single 
representation, then performing the act is a commitment to that representation. It follows 
that committing to the representation is the same thing as committing to the action. 
Taking the reality of deliberative revision seriously, we have come to see that this 
presumption about practical commitment cannot be correct. The picture of an action with 
which we start is not the same as the one with which we conclude. Performing an action 
is not simply committing to a given representation of it.  
Action theorists see practical commitment as a function of our beliefs about 
action. Here again, we are seeing that we cannot foist the work of practical commitment 
onto other elements of our practical psychology. Even antipsychologistic action theorists 
must appeal to some notion of commitment in the performance of an action. We can trace 
this failing back to the presumptions about the role and purpose of instrumental structure 
in practical thought. Whereas instrumentalists assumed that practical commitment is to 
achieving the end, Thompson takes the object of practical commitment to be completing 
the action. And his view commits him to construing practical success as completing the 
action as initially given in representation. However, commitment is no more about 
finishing actions than it is about achieving ends. That is apparent because of how we 






Prioritizing in an Action-theoretic Context 
My arguments up to this point show that Thompson’s view is in need of revision. 
That conclusion came by way of illustrating that his assumptions about practical 
commitment are misguided. Stepping back and considering the larger thesis I have been 
urging about practical commitment, I need to follow these arguments up with reasons for 
thinking that the mistakes being made by Thompson about practical commitment demand 
an entirely different conception of our underlying practical psychology. Once again, then, 
we need to return to the prioritization problem.  
Thompson does not address questions about how to choose a particular course of 
action from amongst one’s options, so we cannot say exactly how he would respond to 
the prioritization problem. Given the structural affinity between traditional 
instrumentalism and his part-whole conception of action, we can expect that it will be a 
problem for him as well. While instrumentalists take the point of action to be achieving 
goals, Thompson construes our aim in acting to be completing actions. I argued earlier 
that instrumentalists must face up to the reality of walking away from long-term goals, 
but walking away from long-term goals implies that we walk away from large-scale 
actions as well. Thus, Thompson faces a similar tension between how we manage our 
actions and his presumption that we commit to completing them.   
I just finished arguing that, despite Thompson’s antipsychologism, there is an 
implicit appeal to a certain kind of practical commitment present in his view: 
Thompsonian agents commit to the initial part-whole conception of their actions. They 
can specify some of the details as they proceed, but the overarching frame must remain 
the same on pain of losing their grip on an action’s unity. There are two ways of 
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understanding this commitment. First, we can understand the commitment 
psychologically, as we did with instrumentalist accounts. We commit to an action 
because we want to complete our actions. Thompson might have to accept this 
psychological moment, but he will certainly resist it, so he might try to construe the 
element of commitment theoretically. The type of commitment at stake in Thompson’s 
account would be an intellectual commitment to one’s belief about an action based on its 
representation. Either way, the assumption is false: we abandon large-scale actions all the 
time, and we revise and update our representations of what we are doing just as 
frequently. It’s apparent, then, that Thompson shares the blind spot of his instrumentalist 
counterpart when it comes to large-scale actions.  
What’s more, if we accept Thompson’s conclusion that instrumental reasoning 
just is a variety of part-whole reasoning, it follows that the deliberative strategy he 
endorses is exactly as inept at setting priorities as plain-old means-end reasoning. Recall 
that prioritizing becomes a deliberative challenge in virtue of the staying and swamping 
problems. The staying problem was an inability to stick with a certain plan of action, and 
instead, allowing oneself to be pulled in different directions by inclination. The 
swamping problem was an inability to register an authentic preference for a certain action 
when there are a number of options from which to choose. Means-end reasoning is not a 
resource for solving these problem, and part-whole reasoning isn’t either.  
Of course, he can try to insist that part-whole reasoning can set priorities. The 
strategy will be to make setting priorities an action, and the deliberative task will be 
filling in the parts of that action. Without priorities already in place, it is unlikely that 
Thompsonian agents will succeed in such deliberation. Even if they did, performing the 
94 
 
act would be vulnerable to the staying and swamping problems. This brings us back to 
the place in my earlier argument where we saw that this method of setting priorities is 




Thompson’s first available response is to fall back on the traditional approach of 
measuring and ranking psychological attitudes. The objects to be measured and ranked on 
his view would be the degrees of commitment agents make to particular actions. 
Depending on what Thompson wants to say about it, that would direct the strategy at 
background psychological considerations like desire, or the intellectual commitment to a 
belief. Whichever he endorses, he will find the corresponding problems that arise in 
relation to measuring and ranking. Philosophers will argue that there is no such feature to 




His second option would be to accept that another deliberative strategy does the 
work of setting priorities. Thompson is not committed to the exclusivity clause of 
instrumentalism, and so he can concede that we deliberate about priorities in a different 
way. Heeding the arguments of Chapter II, however, we saw that the prioritization 
problem not only calls for acknowledging the need for an additional deliberative strategy, 
it also shows that instrumental reasoning cannot be a uniquely fundamental form of 
practical reasoning. By analogy, the prioritization problem also shows that part-whole 
reasoning cannot be uniquely fundamental, and this is a conclusion that Thompson will 
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I pointed out in Chapter II that actions chosen on the basis of self-directed 
prioritization are susceptible to a calculative analysis only in retrospect. I also claimed 
that instrumental reasoning could not lead you to the choice of a self-directed action by 
itself. Given the arguments from Thompson that we’ve surveyed, it’s plausible to think 
that he would not concede these points. For he takes his arguments to show that the 
action-theoretic and/or instrumental reasons for acting enjoy a privileged position in 
practical reasoning: “What is distinctive about the form of thought-dependence under 
discussion here, as will I think be seen, is that it is internally related to the idea of action 
in ways the other things are not.”104 The “other things” to which he is referring are other 
types of deliberative strategies. So this is evidence that he takes the place of action-
theoretic reasoning to be uniquely privileged.  
Thompson isn’t thinking about the problem of figuring out what to do, and he 
doesn’t express any concern over whether the problem is a serious one, so it’s natural to 
think that he would resist acknowledging the special place of self-directed prioritization 
in practical reasoning. Presuming that to be the case, defending the primacy of part-whole 
reasoning requires returning to the claim that it can set priorities. We will see that my 
earlier arguments against the instrumentalist on this issue apply here as well: attempting 
to resolve the problem with nothing but part-whole reasoning will fail in exactly the ways 
that instrumentalist accounts did.  
Just as we saw that the fairly abstract goal of setting priorities didn’t have enough 
substance to determine the means for achieving it, so the whole action of setting priorities 
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can’t show us how to fill in the parts of that action. A multitude of options present 
themselves, and without a prioritization strategy in place, agents fall prey to the staying 
and swamping problems in trying to figure out how to perform the act of setting 
priorities. We considered Schmidtz’s strategy of using a maieutic end for setting 
priorities. The analogue here would be to embed the action in a larger action, but this 
strategy seems even less promising in this context: there is no reason to think that adding 
more parts to the action will make the ones you can’t see any clearer.  
The final move is to concede that something other than part-whole reasoning sets 
priorities for us. Looking to self-directed prioritization to fill the deliberative gap, what’s 
needed is a calculative structure underwriting one’s large-scale actions. So Thompson 
might try to suggest that we embrace the action of constructing that calculative structure. 
The calculative structure one generates, however, must be grounded in authentic concerns 
and interests. We learn about what really matters to us through experience, and that 
means it will take time. If that’s the case, we cannot trust agents who do not see building 
up a calculative structure for general long-term plans as a priority to actually succeed in 
completing the task. Thus, Thompson finds himself in the same unhappy predicament as 
his counterpart instrumentalist: neither preference ranking nor part-whole reasoning can 
solve the prioritization problem. However, accepting that another deliberative strategy is 
needed upends the conviction that action-theoretic reasoning is uniquely fundamental in 







I have argued in this chapter that any model of practical reasoning should be a 
model that incorporates evolving drafts of an agent’s action. Just as writers produce 
numerous drafts of their final manuscript, we as agents produce drafts of our actions as 
we proceed. In many standard cases, the part-whole conception of an action with which 
we started looks nothing like the structure through which we complete an action. And just 
as early manuscripts play a different role in the writing process than later ones do, we 
should expect that the representations of an action before, during, and after the fact will 
play distinctive roles in deliberation.  
Underlying these observations, we have come to see that action theorists have 
also failed to acknowledge the need to provide an account of practical commitment. 
Taking up an antipsychologistic stance did not liberate them from the problems that arise 
with respect to those issues. Because action-theoretical reasoning also failed to manage 
the problem of setting priorities, practical commitment continues to be a concern in need 
of attention. Since I’ve argued that we do not commit to a given theoretical representation 
of our action any more than desire or intention, we must inquire into what the proper 
objects of authentic practical commitment are. 
Integrating these conclusions into a theory of practical rationality will require a 
break from the instrumentalist tradition that goes even farther than the action theorists 
have gone. They took up the task of incorporating the notion of a process into how we 
think about action. Taking their efforts as a first draft, we must now being the work of 
revising and editing.  
Finally, the work in the chapter puts the last piece in place for drawing the larger 
98 
 
conclusion of my project. Taking instrumental structure and reasoning for granted, we 
have misunderstood its role in practical deliberation. This conclusion is grounded by the 
observation that instrumental practical psychology cannot provide an effective strategy 
for setting priorities. Without them, we could not succeed in achieving any of our goals, 










The main goal of this project has been coming to terms with a basic observation 
about our lives: experience changes who we are as individuals, and this affects what we 
want and what we want to pursue. That fact creates problems for contemporary theories 
of practical rationality by standing in opposition to the traditional assumption that our 
main purpose is to achieve our goals. This conflict forces us to seek an explanation for 
why we construct long-term plans even though we typically walk away from them.  
The account of self-directed prioritization that I’ve offered seeks to provide that 
explanation: we have long-term goals and construct extended plans as a resource for 
solving the prioritization problem quickly and easily. This deliberative strategy takes 
advantage of elements in our long-term plans as grounds for excluding possible courses 
of action in the present. The reason for having long-term goals, then, is to use them in 
solving current deliberative dilemmas. Seen from that perspective, distant goals are 
aspirations guiding present action, and serving that purpose rationalizes having them 
without a further commitment to achieving them.  
Since my account reverses the traditional assumption that decision and action 
primarily serve the future, it reorients agency toward local decision and action. This 
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should be a satisfying outcome because, from the standpoint of agential success, concern 
about the present must trump our investment in the future. If we cannot be successful 
agents now, there is no point to planning for the distant future. Indeed, my thesis can help 
to explain why we would have developed such a rich and sophisticated ability to think 
about the future: it provides us with a highly developed capacity to strategize about what 
we are doing in present circumstances. For manipulating one’s current environment in 
more subtle and precise ways is a skill that even nonplanning agents would value. 
My proposal also liberates us from the tendency to construe the calculative 
structure of practical thought in exclusively instrumental terms. Self-direction is not the 
same thing as means-end reasoning or plan integration, but it makes use of the same 
structure in determining a course of action. Instrumental reasoning just is not the right 
kind of skill for setting priorities, and  moreover, agents without priorities already in 
place will be unsuccessful in trying to determine the means to the end of having 
priorities. Thus, as a deliberative strategy, self-direction shows that we reason about 
calculative structure in more than one way. But this is just one proposal; if we can 
manipulate the structure in more than one way, we should expect that there will be a 
variety of tactics we can employ. Recognizing this reveals a prime target for future 
investigation. We can begin to uncover new deliberative strategies by examining 
particular deliberative problems. 
Another result was that construing choice as a matter of ranking options is 
unworkable. Effective deliberation about one’s present options avoids assessments of 
value, understood as the strengths of desires, obligations, or commitments. This will have 
consequences for current debate in theories of value. For instance, if we put aside 
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questions of value in deliberation, worries about incommensurability become less 
pressing for practical philosophy. I also introduced a new way of thinking about the value 
we place on our self-conceptions. One’s current practical ideal—which we use in self-
direction—contains the constellation of long-term goals one has in view. I argued that our 
commitment to having a practical ideal is separate from the commitments we make to 
individual long-term goals. Thus, a practical ideal is itself an object of value, and we are 
motivated by it above and beyond the goals that make it up.  
One benefit of this approach is that, since the calculative structure of extended 
plans gives content to one’s ideal, we can appeal to that structure in achieving self-
understanding both for ourselves and in communicating with others about who we are as 
individuals. I tell others about myself by telling them about my larger goals, and I convey 
even more information by gesturing at how I am planning to achieve them. However, 
practical ideals can inform an historical self-understanding as well. Because it evolves as 
long-term goals change, we can construct a personal narrative by telling the story of what 
adjustments occurred, and how they came about.  
The phenomena of evolving practical ideals and long-term goals draws attention 
to the nature of practical commitment. On a clear-headed assessment, it is—first and 
foremost—transient. That fact underwrites the need for a strategy like self-directed 
prioritization. In addition, the role of practical commitment in practical reasoning is 
independent of other elements in deliberation such as desire, intention, and belief. 
Incorporating these considerations into an account of practical rationality alters our 
understanding of practical psychology and deliberation. Thus, building an adequate 
theory of practical commitment into our model of practical rationality will have 
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significant consequences for moral theory.  
My primary research objective in the near future is to determine how my view can 
inform ethical debate. Since philosophers assumed that achieving our aims was all that 
mattered, they focused on the psychology of setting goals and determining which goals 
were morally appropriate. Thus, one way of understanding contemporary debate between 
cognitive and noncognitive accounts of moral psychology is to construe it as trying to 
establish the role that reason plays in deciding one’s ends. Regardless of which side one 
takes in that debate, the determination of one’s ends won’t be the only morally relevant 
consideration; for the moral significance of one’s aims depends on the commitment one 
makes to them. Acknowledging that this consideration is a variable and not a constant 
will have to inform the moral assessment of an agent’s goals.  
Furthermore, my thesis—that having long-term goals is not necessarily a 
commitment to achieving them—presents a serious problem for one of the central moral 
theories in the tradition: consequentialism. Standard consequentialist moral theories 
assert that we should assess the moral status of an action on the basis of its actual or 
expected outcomes, and nothing further; but if we are not fully committed to achieving 
our ends, and we typically abandon the large majority of them, consequentialist 
assessment starts to lose its grip on the moral significance of what we are doing. This 
critique connects up with questions of the moral import of decisions made on the basis of 
self-direction: in many cases the real question is not about the ethical evaluation of 
achieving an end, but rather the significance of its function in local decision-making. 
Working these issues out is preparation for taking up consideration of the varieties of 
practical commitment at work in our lives. 
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We have come to see that practical commitment is not entirely a matter of our 
psychological attitudes. Thompson’s action-theoretic account drew attention to how the 
commitment we make to our beliefs also informs deliberation. In addition, the claim that 
we construct and utilize a practical ideal in setting priorities is another dimension of 
practical commitment, since committing to an ideal is independent of committing to 
particular goals. This at least suggests that progress in practical rationality will come by 
way of marking the distinctions between aspects of practical commitment more clearly.  
Finally, I have shown that an adequate understanding of practical rationality and 
practical psychology requires resisting the attractions of an instrumental approach. The 
point is not to abandon the insights that reflection on means-end reasoning and the 
calculative structure of practical thought reveal. Rather, we need a better perspective on 
their significance. This project has made some progress by scrutinizing exactly how we 
use instrumental reasoning in our day to day lives. Pursuing the goal of integrating my 
conclusions into a general theory of practical rationality will make our theory accountable 
to the facts on the ground. As long as we continue to have that goal in view, it will allow 
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